Papers for
privacy protection teams
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Membership inference fails using image frequency detail to detect memorization
Frequency-Domain Membership Inference Does Not Beat Confidence Thresholding: A Band-Resolved Analysis of Why
Abstract: A widely repeated account of membership inference holds that models lean on fine-grained detail for samples they have memorized, so degrading an input's resolution should expose membership through how quickly a prediction falls apart. We test that account band by band. A monotone family of zero-phase low-pass filters is applied to each query image, the target's confidence on its original prediction is read at every step, and the resulting decay is scored in a dozen ways. Two federated ResNet-18 targets are studied, one trained normally and one pushed to a 45.1-point generalization gap. The account does not survive. On the normally trained target the best profile score reaches an AUC of 0.513 against 0.537 for a single confidence threshold, and on the overfit target 0.735 against 0.943. A search over 1206 candidate scores, with direction chosen on a held-out half and a fitted combination as an upper bound, produces no score that beats the threshold in either regime. The failure has a mechanism: the mean confidence gap between members and non-members grows as detail is removed, exactly as the hypothesis predicts, but the spread grows faster, so discriminability falls from the first step onward. Decomposing each image into phase and magnitude shows why no band-localized operation can work, since the advantage travels with image structure, surviving at 0.567 when the phase is kept and collapsing to 0.492 when only the magnitude is. Membership is a whole-image identity effect rather than an accumulation of spectral energy in any band, and defenses aimed at high-frequency reliance are aimed at the wrong target.
Black-box method improves face photo privacy by smartly using small changes
SSM-Attack: Learning Where to Perturb for Black-Box Face Privacy
Abstract: Face recognition systems are deployed widely enough that a photograph shared online can be matched without its subject's consent. Generator-based protection methods rely on heavy pretrained backbones, multi-stage inference or visible semantic edits. We introduce SSM-Attack, a black-box face privacy framework built on Selective State Space Models. Rather than synthesizing the perturbation, the state-space model predicts in one linear-time pass a spatial allocation of the perturbation budget, marking which facial locations carry identity evidence; a short projected refinement then sets the values within this per-pixel budget. Against published benchmark results, SSM-Attack attains the highest average black-box attack success rate on all three evaluation sets: 87.10 percent on CelebA-HQ, 86.90 on LADN and 81.15 on FFHQ, the last from a network that never saw that dataset. The allocation network holds 5.73 million parameters, or 16.13 million with the frozen networks used by its quality terms. Under the same cap of 0.10 on the maximum per-pixel change, allocation improves structural similarity by 0.044, peak signal-to-noise ratio by 1.62 decibels and Frechet Inception Distance by 11.2 points over a uniform map while spending 37 percent of its capacity. Strong facial privacy protection therefore does not require a large generative prior; it requires knowing where to spend a small one.