Papers for

political negotiation teams

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Core nonemptiness holds for two thirds convex cooperative games

Core nonemptiness for $2/3$-convex games

Abstract: We study the core of $2/3$-convex games, a class of transferable-utility (TU) games that generalizes convex games, which requires at least two of any three distinct coalitions satisfy the supermodular inequality. We show that every $2/3$-convex game admits a marginal worth vector in the core, and hence has a nonempty core. Our proof is constructive and yields a linear-time algorithm for finding such a core allocation. We also show that $2/3$-convexity does not imply permutational convexity in general, while the implication holds under an additional superadditivity condition on pairs of singletons. As an application, we introduce a TU model motivated by the OSCE's consensus-minus-two procedure and show that the resulting game is $2/3$-convex but need not be convex.

Thu 12 NovComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Some cooperative situations in math called games can be hard to share fairly. The authors study a special class called two thirds convex games, which relaxes previous fairness rules. They prove these games always have a stable way to distribute value so no group wants to break away. They also provide a fast method to find such fair divisions and link this to a real-world voting method called consensus-minus-two.
Open → 2611.16207v1