platform product managers

Abstract: Platforms ask customers for online reviews to reduce self-selection, but theory conflicts on whether review solicitation makes online ratings more or less informative. Selection theory implies that asking helps, voice theory that it dilutes the news, and research on rating inflation that compression destroys information. We reconcile these views with signal detection theory, which separates what a rating knows (its sensitivity) from what it shows (its criterion). We test the framework on Steam, a leading PC video game store, whose client began in October 2019 to prompt players for a review after about three hours of play. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design at that inferred threshold in 21.6 million Steam reviews of 315 games, we find that review counts just above the threshold become 4.25 times those just below, and the jump in the positive share grows by 6.6 percentage points. Agreement with critics changes little near launch and erodes later. The rating's movement changes far more: pass-through from reviews written in the first two hours falls from 0.73 to 0.18 just above the threshold, against 0.81 to 0.64 just below, and a fixed rating tier responds to 12% of downturns in those reviews above the threshold, down from 42%, against 41% and 47% below it. What the stream knows changes less. At equal review counts its sensitivity falls more above the threshold, because added reviews respond about half as much and scores near the ceiling are noisier per review, but at natural counts added volume offsets this loss, leaving a change of -0.03 relative to the stream below (95% CI -0.13 to 0.06). Failures that developers acknowledge, which run through complaints, still move the score after launch. Review prompts therefore mainly change how a rating must be read, and platforms that solicit reviews should recalibrate their rating labels.

Abstract: Digital marketplaces increasingly earn revenue from transaction commissions and seller-facing data services. Sellers may purchase data to increase revenue or avoid competing with an informed rival. We examine how consumer disclosure rights shape these motives and the platform's incentive to provide data. We develop a game-theoretic model of a commissioned platform, two differentiated sellers, and privacy-sensitive consumers. Data generates value through bilateral sales-revenue gains and competition threats arising from asymmetric access. Under mandatory collection, the platform can monetize defensive adoption, even when bilateral personalization reduces seller revenue. Under voluntary disclosure, anonymous purchasing and strictly positive privacy costs make unilateral disclosure unattractive in the baseline. Exclusive access thus yields no usable information, restores sellers' no-data rejection payoffs, and eliminates defensive fees. Profitable provision therefore requires nonnegative bilateral revenue gains. Under full fee extraction, sellers retain their no-data net profits. This revenue alignment does not guarantee welfare gains: additional transactions may benefit consumers, whereas segmentation in an already covered market can raise anonymous prices and reduce welfare. Capping anonymous offers at their no-data benchmark protects individual consumers and limits positive-mass provision to the transaction-creation region. Extensions consider access choice, heterogeneous privacy costs, imperfect identification, and limited contractual credibility. Platforms should evaluate data services based on both bilateral-use and seller-rejection outcomes, and sellers should distinguish revenue-enhancing from defensive investments. Regulators should distinguish equal-access rules from effective consumer control and monitor pricing in anonymous channels.