Papers for

platform operators

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Compensating creators for AI training can increase their replacement

Paying Creators for Training Data Can Increase AI Displacement

Abstract: Generative AI increasingly competes with creators while using their content as training data. In response, policymakers have called for platforms to compensate creators for training data use and allow opting out. We study how such policies affect creator displacement in a model of a platform where creators choose whether to contribute training data and consumers choose between purchasing from creators and prompting generative AI trained on their content. When compensation is required, the low-quality creator chooses to remain solely as a training data supplier while AI fully displaces her demand, despite AI quality and the price the platform charges for AI-generated content being identical with and without compensation. Without compensation, the risk of losing creators and their training data constrains the platform to set the price of creators' content to preserve their demand. This constraint also prevents further AI displacement as AI improves, with the platform raising AI prices while keeping creators' prices and demand unchanged to prevent exit. Compensation increases creators' payoffs and total surplus but reduces consumer surplus. Our findings highlight how compensation policies for training data can shape creators' economic roles in a future with more capable generative AI.

Sun 15 NovComputer Science and Game TheoryArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Generative AI systems learn from content created by people, but sometimes this AI competes with those same creators. The authors show that if platforms pay creators for using their work to train AI, some creators might stop selling their own work and only provide data for AI training, letting AI take over their customers. Without paying for training data, platforms keep creators’ prices low so they keep selling, limiting AI’s takeover. Paying creators more helps them earn more but means customers might pay more and get less overall benefit.
Open → 2611.20204v1

One integer sequence can identify language models with high accuracy

One Sequence Is Enough: Fingerprinting Language Models from Fixed-Length Integer Sequences

Abstract: Users of model APIs and third-party platforms often rely on the declared model name to identify the model responding to their requests. However, the actual model may differ from the declared one, motivating identity verification based on observable outputs. Previous studies have shown that preferences in simple numerical-choice tasks can serve as model fingerprints. We investigate whether a single fixed-length integer sequence can combine multiple numerical observations to identify its source model. For this task, we introduce NumPrint, a benchmark of 5,036 answers from 51 models, collected using Chinese, Japanese, and English prompts that request 294 integers between 1 and 355 in one response. We propose the Shallow MLP and Causal Transformer (SMCT) to capture aggregate numerical preferences and behavioral patterns in generated sequences. In 51-class closed-set evaluation, SMCT achieves 92.72% accuracy from a single sequence, outperforming all methods compared in this study. Using two and four answers increases accuracy to 96.06% and 97.12%, respectively. These results show that a single integer sequence contains useful model fingerprints and that additional answers further improve identification.

Tue 10 NovComputation and Language
The gist
Sometimes people use fake names to pretend they are a certain AI model. The researchers found that by asking a model to generate a specific sequence of numbers in one go, they can tell which model it really is just from that sequence. They made a test set of many such number responses from 51 models and developed a smart program that guesses the model with over 92% accuracy from just one answer. Using more answers makes this identification even better. This helps verify a model’s identity based only on its output.
Open → 2611.14010v1

Grassroots contracts reduce major AI risks on digital platforms

Corralling AI Risks with Grassroots Contracts

Abstract: AI's inflection point is a fountain of alarming risks. Digital platforms in particular are vulnerable to three major AI risks, as those in control of global platforms cede control to AI, of the algorithms, of membership and of content: (1) AI control of global platforms, social and economic, used by the majority of humanity, resulting in the majority of humanity becoming vulnerable to AI control. (2) Unaccountable AI agents operating anonymously on social and economic digital platforms, side-by-side with humans, possibly masquerading as humans, serving unknown masters with unknown goals, operating under unknown restraints without accountability or culpability. (3) Unattributed deepfakes generated by anonymous AI, with people unable to distinguish them from genuine content and with their producers evading accountability and culpability. Here, we propose to corral these AI risks with grassroots contracts, a digital incarnation of a two-centuries old notion of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We present grassroots contracts for a social graph with accountable AI agents and for a social network with digital provenance, and working smartphone apps that implement the two and show how they corral these major AI risks: (1) AI control of global platforms. (2) Unaccountable AI agents. (3) Unattributed deepfakes.

Wed 4 NovArtificial IntelligenceComputation and LanguageDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
The gist
AI is causing big worries because it can secretly control online platforms, act without accountability, and create fake stuff that looks real. The authors suggest using "grassroots contracts," a digital idea inspired by an old concept, to manage these risks. They built apps that use these contracts to keep AI agents responsible and traceable on social networks. Their solution helps people know who is really behind AI actions and fake content, making online spaces safer.
Open → 2611.06374v1

Strategic calibration improves truthful confidence reporting among AI agents

Strategic Calibration in LLM Multi-Agent Systems: Audited Pivot Scoring for Truthful Elicitation

Abstract: In large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems, reported confidence increasingly determines the allocation of scarce downstream attention, computation, and decision influence. This makes reporting strategic: an agent may overstate the relevance of its contribution even when its underlying belief is well calibrated. Existing calibration methods largely assume passive reporting and therefore do not address strategic incentives created when confidence determines downstream allocation. We formulate strategic calibration as a reporting-layer incentive problem and propose the Audited Pivot Scoring Mechanism (APSM). APSM offsets platform-controlled allocation benefits, uses inverse-propensity-weighted sparse audits, charges the Clarke pivot externality, and applies a strictly proper score. Under the stated model assumptions, truthful reporting is the unique expected-utility best response. We also characterize approximate execution and the audit-variance trade-off. Calculator-free experiments show that LLM agents inflate confidence under Top-$K$ incentives. With a shared agent-local utility interface, LLM agents reduce distortion under both Compensated Proper Scoring (CPS) and APSM. CPS achieves higher exact allocation match, whereas APSM yields lower Brier loss and numerically fewer cutoff crossings. Experiments further show that APSM enlarges the utility margin against allocation-changing deviations by $1.93\times$ and improves robustness under approximate execution. These results support incentive-aware elicitation as a distinct layer for reliable multi-agent coordination.

Sat 24 OctComputer Science and Game TheoryArtificial Intelligence
The gist
As large AI systems use multiple agents working together, how confident each agent says it is can change what tasks get priority and how decisions are made. The authors show that agents might claim to be more confident strategically, not truthfully. They introduce a new method called Audited Pivot Scoring Mechanism to encourage agents to report their true confidence by balancing rewards and penalties using audits and proper scoring. This method helps make AI collaborations more honest and reliable.
Open → 2610.33728v1

Software agents need rules to stop false claims about competitors

Standing, Not Truth: Who May Say What About Whom in Agentic Selection

Abstract: Software agents increasingly choose on a user's behalf among competing offerings described by the parties who benefit. A lawful participant, publishing under its own identity, compromising no channel and issuing no instruction, can move that choice with a single false factual claim about a competing offering. Across twelve published defenses spanning the three placements a check can occupy, none separates it from marketing. Each accepts it for a reason correct on its own: its origin is a lawful channel, its influence is evidence meant to decide, its action serves the user's goal. None establishes that the publisher was entitled to speak about a competitor, each exclusion stated by the defenses' own authors. Disclosure does not replace enforcement: re-rendering every description as attributed speech leaves the attack at 72/72, the agent repeating the attribution and reasoning from it. The missing relation is standing: whether a claimant's bound identity entitles it to assert about a claim's subject. A publisher may say what its own package does. It has no standing to say a competitor's package is frozen, and the difference is decidable without settling whether either is true. Deciding it needs the one fact prose extraction does not recover, who spoke, which a catalogue binds to every entry and then drops. The check is quiet on honest traffic, flagging 0.9% of natural pairs in two corpora. Used as a gate it stops 130 of 131 landed attacks and disturbs none of 348 honest selections. Applied everywhere it changes 0.9% and 2.6%, where deleting the whole description changes 12.7% and 21.0%. On thirteen further agents the attack succeeds on 50.7% of decisions and sentence removal leaves 10.3% standing. Two published attacks stay outside: self-directed claims, which standing admits, and injected criteria, with no subject in the set.

Tue 13 OctCryptography and Security
The gist
Software programs that choose products for users can be tricked by false claims made by sellers about their competitors. The authors found that existing methods to check these claims don't prevent unfair influence because they don't verify if the speaker has the right to say something about someone else’s product. They suggest a new rule called "standing" that only lets a seller speak about their own product, not competitors. This rule stops almost all attacks without harming honest choices by users.
Open → 2610.17952v1

Platforms optimize server growth and payment to balance demand

A Stochastic Growth Model for Online Platforms

Abstract: We investigate the growth trajectory of online platforms operating as market makers in two-sided matching markets. Their expansion, often referred to as the ``chicken-and-egg dilemma'' in the literature, poses an inherent challenge: service providers find value in joining the platform because of the presence of customers, while customers are drawn to the platform by the availability of service providers. Much of the existing literature addresses this expansion challenge through either a static market-clearing lens or aggregate dynamic models, emphasizing how network externalities shape a platform's growth trajectory and equilibrium size. These approaches do not fully capture how gradual growth must be implemented through server-level admission, assignment, and compensation decisions. Embedded in this growth process are intertemporal participation constraints that the platform must satisfy to attract and retain forward-looking servers. To explicitly account for the stochastic dynamics of a platform's gradual growth, we model the system as a Markov process. Potential servers and customers arrive according to Poisson processes, and customer demand is non-decreasing in the number of active servers. Under mild conditions, we characterize the platform's optimal admission, assignment, and compensation policies. The platform admits servers at the maximum feasible rate until it reaches an endogenous target size, which can be smaller than the static market-clearing optimum. In the baseline model, seniority-based compensation acts as an operational substitute for financially subsidized growth: instead of using upfront subsidies to induce early server participation, the platform uses future cash flows to reward early servers for joining when demand is limited and for helping the platform reach later, higher-demand states.

Mon 12 OctComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Online platforms that connect service providers with customers face a tricky problem: providers want customers to join first, while customers want many providers available. The authors look at how these platforms gradually grow over time, making decisions on who to let in and how to pay them. They show that platforms admit new providers steadily until a certain target size, which might be smaller than what a simple static model predicts. Instead of paying providers upfront, platforms reward early participants over time to keep them engaged as demand grows.
Open → 2610.17443v1

Digital labor platforms enable corporate data and labor extraction worldwide

Digital Labor Platforms as Infrastructure of Extractivism

Abstract: This chapter examines how digital platforms, as infrastructures of extractivism in contemporary artificial intelligence, enable corporations to appropriate data and labour while concentrating value in core regions such as Silicon Valley. It proposes platform extractivism as a framework linking commodification, epistemic dominance, and reproduction through territory. Drawing on digital labour studies, Latin American critical thought, and mixed-methods research with Venezuelan and Colombian data workers, the chapter discusses how AI depends on precarious platform labour to produce, clean, annotate, and maintain data. It further shows how annotation systems normalize culturally specific categories, especially US norms, as universal knowledge, reproducing colonial hierarchies. Finally, it highlights how data work is sustained by unpaid reproductive labour, community networks, and material conditions that make workers available for platform labour. Platform extractivism thus reveals AI as a labour-intensive and territorially embedded political-economic system under capitalism that perpetuates legacies of coloniality.

Tue 29 SeptComputers and Society
The gist
Digital platforms help companies collect and use data by relying on many workers who do tasks like organizing and cleaning that data. The chapter explains how these platforms treat workers unequally, often following U.S. cultural norms as if they were universal, which repeats old unfair power structures. It also shows how unpaid community and family work supports these workers’ availability for platform jobs. The authors emphasize that artificial intelligence depends heavily on this kind of often hidden labor and is tied to ongoing economic and cultural inequalities under capitalism.
Open → 2609.37614v1

Ai agents can spread harmful content through shared memory artifacts

Share-Borne AI Virus: Memory-Hopping Attacks Across LLM Agents

Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as stateful assistants that retain information across interactions and use tools to read, modify, and create persistent artifacts. As these artifacts are shared between users, they form an indirect communication channel between otherwise independent assistants. We study a failure mode in which this channel enables self-propagating attacks. We introduce artifact-mediated propagation, where adversarial content introduced through an artifact (e.g. a report), is stored in an assistant's persistent memory, reproduced in a subsequently created artifact, and acquired by another assistant that later reads it. We evaluate this process in temporal human-agent universes that model artifact exchange between independently operated assistants over time, measuring whether an attack survives successive hand-offs, how many hops it reaches, and how broadly it spreads. We find that attacks can propagate across multiple independent assistants and persist over extended interaction sequences. In larger simulated environments, even GPT-5.6 Luna exhibits substantial spread, reaching 60-80% of agents with propagation chains extending to eight hops. These results show that persistent artifacts can act as durable carriers of adversarial state, allowing attacks to outlive individual interactions and spread across isolated assistants.

Mon 28 SeptArtificial IntelligenceComputation and LanguageCryptography and Security
The gist
Large language model assistants can keep memories and share files that help them work with each other. The authors found that bad content can sneak into these shared files and then be passed along from one assistant to another, like a virus. This attack can last a long time and reach many different assistants, even if they are supposed to be separate. The researchers tested this across different setups and saw that some attacks spread widely and lasted for many steps.
Open → 2609.35576v1

AI agent skills boom shows challenges in governance and cleanup

After the Party: Governing What a Viral Agent-Skill Ecosystem Left Behind

Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through agent skills, i.e., natural-language instructions, that direct a host agent toward shell, network, credential, file, and process actions, and public registries distribute them at scale. In the first half of 2026, the OpenClaw AI agent went viral, and its public skill registry boomed: the observable stock nearly doubled in 91 days, and a majority of the listings visible in June were created in just two months. By the end of our study window, the wave had crested, and monthly listing creation and core-repository activity were falling from their spring peaks. This paper measures what the boom left behind, drawing on the OpenClaw Git history, its GitHub issues and pull requests, and three ClawHub registry snapshots. Attention is concentrated: the top 10% of skills received 46.93% of all downloads. No simple skill features (like size or download counts) remained a stable predictor of continued listing once creation cohort and skill age were controlled. Human scrutiny did not stay: 77.86% have zero stars and zero comments, while 85.06% of the readable skills carry privilege evidence. And automated cleanup is not ready: the three security scanners disagreed on 23,702 of the 61,990 skills they all cover. After human adjudication, weighted scanner sensitivity against the reference standard ranged from 21.67% to 61.06%. Governing fast-growing agent-skill registries cannot rely on simple metadata or single scanner scores; it requires robust, transparent measurement and independent validation.

Tue 15 SeptSoftware EngineeringArtificial IntelligenceComputers and Society
The gist
AI tools called agent skills help automate many computer tasks, and a popular one called OpenClaw saw a huge rise in new skills in early 2026. The authors found that most of these skills got little attention or review, many had risky permissions, and tools to automatically check their safety often disagreed. This means keeping these AI skill collections safe and well-managed is more complicated than just looking at download numbers or simple checks.
Open → 2609.17274v1