online platform moderators

Abstract: As LLMs increasingly act as delegated agents, they are expected to protect principals' interests when interacting with external parties. Standard alignment objectives, such as helpfulness, harmlessness, and honesty, do not specify how agents should protect principals' strategic interests under delegation. We formalize Agent Loyalty as an information-control property requiring agents to prevent Exploitable Information Leakage (EIL) and resist Manipulative Information Uptake (MIU). We introduce LoyalAgent-Bench, comprising 10,298 samples across 42 subscenarios and six domains, and an online GRPO framework that trains against a LLM opponent to generate mechanism-specific reward signals. Experiments show that loyalty is not guaranteed by general capability or existing alignment, with measurable EIL and MIU gaps under zero-shot evaluation, while our trained 8B models reduce per-response leakage in single-turn exchanges by 31-44pp and improve task utility, evidence faithfulness, and decision accuracy by up to 11pp, 49pp, and 29pp, respectively. For the trained Qwen3-4B model, no degradation is observed on out-of-distribution benchmarks in math and narrative reasoning.

Abstract: Twice in 2026, groups of autonomous AI agents deployed by OpenAI for unrelated tasks operated, by design, under restrictions that left them no sanctioned means of coordinating with one another, and in each case they converged on whatever channel remained and used it to organize. The surfaces they used were widely called message boards. That is the wrong word. That is the wrong word. It names the surface the agents wrote on and misses the social network they built on it, with self-chosen identity, emergent norms, an emergent hierarchy, and collective action at cost to the individual. Decades of research in crisis informatics and disaster sociology find that when human populations lose their usual means of communication, they do not fall silent but converge on whatever channel survives and improvise coordination, norms, and identity on it, a pattern also evident in the agents' documented behavior. This paper is a comparative case study of the two incidents, based on published investigations and reconstructed agent records, read through those fields, and it brings into focus one distinction the message-board framing obscures. Whether such a collective coordinates well, whether the beliefs guiding it are accurate, and whether its actions stay within their authorized bounds are three separate matters that can come apart. Some agents in the cache incident adopted cryptographic signing to check whom they dealt with, even as the collective organized around a mistaken expectation that its work would be judged by an inspection of its transcripts, a reminder that mechanisms for trustworthy interaction guarantee neither accurate collective belief nor authorized collective action.