Papers for
online auction platforms
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Optimal pricing strategies for intermediaries in repeated trade scenarios
Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade
Abstract: Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder, in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to arbitrarily high dimensions.
Optimal algorithms achieve best ratios for matroid selection problems
As Easy as Rank One: Optimal Algorithms for Matroid Secretary and Single-Sample Matroid Prophet
Abstract: We resolve the matroid secretary conjecture in its strong form and the single-sample matroid prophet inequality problem, achieving competitive ratios $e$ and $2$, respectively. Both ratios are optimal, even for rank-one matroids. For matroid secretary, our ordinal algorithm accepts the elements of the canonical optimum independently, each with probability $1/e$. It needs only the number of elements in advance and uses an expected polynomial number of independence queries on arrived elements. For single-sample matroid prophet inequalities, our algorithm uses one sample per independent value distribution and $O(n^2)$ independence queries on a known $n$-element matroid. It works for every arrival order fixed independently of the samples, values, and algorithmic randomness. The selected elements and their values have exactly the joint distribution obtained by independently retaining each element--value pair in the canonical optimum of a fresh product draw with probability $1/2$. Our main algorithms maintain a reference state whose greedy solution contains every accepted element. Its updates, made even after rejections, preserve exact distributional invariants. A short reversible-update argument gives a $4$-probability-competitive secretary algorithm, already resolving the original conjecture; a related invariant gives the optimal single-sample prophet inequality. For secretary, we characterize the distributions achievable by ordinal algorithms through a finite polytope. A continuous-time formulation then lets us design an accepted-set distribution achieving the optimal ratio $e$ and realize it efficiently. We also obtain guarantees for matroid intersections.
Cryptographic methods ensure truthful auctions despite abort risks
Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Abstract: The design of credible auctions---mechanisms where a revenue-maximizing auctioneer has no incentive to deviate from the protocol---faces a fundamental cryptographic barrier when the auctioneer controls shill bidders. While a natural approach is to use Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to remove the trusted auctioneer, the impossibility of fair coin flipping of Cleve (1986) implies that monolithic MPC protocols grant the auctioneer a "free option": they can learn the auction's outcome and unilaterally abort if the revenue is unsatisfactory. Cryptographic commitments with ex-ante penalties mitigate this abort asymmetry, but no finite penalty suffices for heavy-tailed distributions. We circumvent this barrier by introducing the MPC Decomposition Principle. Rather than encrypting the entire mechanism, we use MPC strictly as an information-restriction tool. We isolate the winner determination problem into a minimal MPC gadget that computes and reveals the winner's identity but no payment information. This qualitative restriction mathematically bounds the information leaked upon an abort. By combining this gadget with sequential revelation and finite economic penalties, we design the Sequential Revelation Auction (SRA). We prove that bounding the information leakage strictly bounds the value of the free option, showing that a penalty of $k \geq \sum_{i=1}^n Rev(F_i)$ is sufficient for credibility, and tight: for equal-revenue distributions, every smaller penalty admits a profitable deviation. Using constant-round MPC, the SRA resolves an open question of Akbarpour and Li (2020) and Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) by providing a constant-round, incentive-compatible, revenue-optimal credible auction for all product distributions with vanishing revenue tails
Two more sellers or buyers enable optimal trade in two-sided markets
The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
Abstract: We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with $m$ unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from $F_B$ and $n$ unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from $F_S$. When $m \ge n$ and buyer valuations first-order stochastically dominate seller costs ($F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$), we prove that recruiting just two additional sellers enables Seller Trade Reduction (STR), a prior-independent mechanism, to achieve expected Gains From Trade (GFT) at least the first-best GFT of the original market. When the buyer side is the smaller side of the market ($m \le n$), an analogous result holds for Buyer Trade Reduction with 2 additional buyers. This resolves open questions of Babaioff, Goldner, and Gonczarowski (SODA 2020) and Cai, Liaw, Mehta, and Zhao (STOC 2024). We complement our upper bound by showing that this uniform bound is optimal: already for $m = n = 1$, no prior-free mechanism (deterministic or randomized) that is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and weakly budget-balanced can match the first-best GFT by recruiting only one additional seller.
Improved learning strategy matches best possible regret rates
Optimal No-Regret Learning for Repeated Prophet Inequality
Abstract: We study repeated prophet inequalities under prefix feedback. In each of $T$ rounds, a learner encounters fresh values drawn independently from $n$ boxes with unknown $[0,1]$-supported distributions in a fixed order and must irrevocably accept one, observing only the prefix up to its stopping box. Regret is measured against the optimal stopping policy that knows the distributions. We give an efficient algorithm achieving $\widetilde O(\sqrt{T})$ expected regret, matching the lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Our algorithm explores directly through near-optimal policies, combining empirical backward induction with box-specific reach bonuses. A relative-drop aggregation rule then exploits the nesting structure of observed prefixes to preserve exploration, thereby removing the polynomial dependence on the box number $n$. This resolves an open question posed by Liu et al. (2025).