Attributing Sensor Deviations to Degradation, Weather, or Attack in Oilfield Digital Twins: A Simulation Study of Probabilistic Attribution and Cost-Based Decisions
Abstract: When an oilfield digital twin disagrees with its instruments, the operator must decide whether the cause is hardware degradation, harsh-weather effects, or malicious data manipulation. Existing digital-twin work appears to treat these causes separately: sensor-validation architectures target faults, and attack-focused twins have been evaluated on water-sector testbeds. We study joint cause attribution on a simulated four-well wellpad with 15 coupled instruments, legitimate operating transients, and weather. A physics-informed twin, identified from normal data only, produces analytical-redundancy residuals; windowed features feed a gradient-boosted classifier whose posterior drives an alarm gate with a fixed false-alarm rate and a cost-based decision rule that may defer to an analyst. On three independently generated sites, the classifier reaches macro-F1 of 0.818 on windows where the injected deviation is observable (0.723 when latent post-onset windows are included at the primary site). The physics twin accounts for essentially all of this: removing the data-driven twin changes macro-F1 by less than 0.01, whereas removing all twins drops it to about 0.58. Attacks are detected quickly (median 1.7 h) but attributed correctly at alarm time only 42% of the time, rising to 73% six hours later. A cost-aware policy that defers ambiguous cases had the lowest expected cost among all policies in every one of 144 cost and prior settings tested, sometimes by a small margin; the result depends on illustrative costs and on analysts resolving deferred cases. A twin-aware attacker was detected in 45% of episodes yet almost never attributed to attack. These results are conditional on the simulator's generative assumptions and have not been validated on field data.