network administrators

Abstract: Cybersecurity operators increasingly encounter sophisticated and fast-paced attacks, making autonomous cyber defense (ACD) a critical approach for supporting timely and effective decision-making. Reinforcement learning (RL)-based ACD agents have the ability to autonomously observe network states and take actions to defend and recover system assets, making them well suited for ACD. However, these agents often face critical trade-offs, such as improving network security while inadvertently degrading service availability or violating other operational priorities such as confidentiality and integrity, raising the core challenge of aligning agent behavior with human-specified goals and intent. In this work, we study the problem of aligning RL-based ACD agents with human-specified operational objectives without requiring costly retraining. We formalize alignment for ACD as a policy shaping problem, where a pretrained RL decision-making policy can be adjusted at test time using predicted attributes over agent actions. We also propose an adaptive approach that dynamically controls the alignment--performance trade-off as operational priorities shift during an ongoing cyber attack. We evaluate our method in a simulated cyber defense environment, CybORG, analyzing performance across multiple alignment objectives using the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) information security triad. Our results show that adaptive test-time policy shaping can significantly improve alignment while preserving core cyber defense performance, offering a practical and scalable alternative to training-time alignment methods in RL. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ITM-Kitware/alignment-cage-challenge-2.

Abstract: This paper presents a preliminary study on the efficacy of network device configuration produced by Large Language Models (LLMs). Currently, the study focuses on routing protocol configurations in a predefined small internetwork with Cisco-based routing devices. The capability of three freely available LLMs with standard capabilities (i.e., with no enhanced features) to produce effective setups is investigated. Prompt engineering methods are excluded in order to assess the "first-response" configurations of the models under consideration. The assessment method is based on the contents of the resulting routing table, aiming at measuring the device functional correctness. For that purpose, the Jaccard index is used to indicate the percentage of correct network prefixes contained in the routing table constructed by the model-based configuration commands. The work provides insights on the maturity and limitations of modern LLMs on aiding network administrators with network device configurations in real deployments.

Abstract: Over the past decade, Metaverse technology (AR/VR) has seen widespread adoption in numerous areas, including gaming, social networking, and online collaboration. Although recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in VR systems, they often apply methods (e.g., pre-installed malicious apps or scripts) from conventional mobile platforms directly, demonstrating impractical attacks that fail to investigate unique privacy leakages specific to VR platforms. In this paper, we present an orthogonal attempt to analyze the attack surface of the power side channel on AR/VR's network connection by capturing the through-wall wireless power in the network transmission medium (e.g., Wi-Fi signals) non-intrusively in a comparatively long distance (e.g., 5.0m-8.0m) and further reconstructing multi-level privacy-aware user behaviors. We propose MetaSpy to validate the feasibility and practicality of our disclosed wireless power-based traffic analysis attack. It first captures through-wall wireless power transmitted from the Wi-Fi router of an adjacent room, identifies the device type, then infers (i) user interactions such as browsing websites, running AR/VR apps, and performing various in-app activities, (ii) unseen VR-specific activities in VR games (e.g., Population: ONE), and (iii) avatar-based user re-identification and virtual keystroke inference corresponding to head movements. We evaluated the effectiveness of MetaSpy in four commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) VR headsets, and the empirical results demonstrate its competitive accuracy in unveiling multi-level user privacy within virtual scenes in through-wall settings at a longer distance (1.8x-80x) than most of the recent studies, and it shows resilience to a series of external interference and impact factors. In addition, we also propose and evaluate effective countermeasures to protect data confidentiality in AR/VR wireless transmission.

Abstract: Large multi-dwelling unit (MDU), student-housing and hospitality networks rarely store resident pre-shared keys (PSKs) on the access point (AP). Instead, the per-resident keys of ePSK, MPSK, DPSK, iPSK or PPSK services are held in an external RADIUS server or cloud database synchronised with the property-management system. Our earlier work, Companion-BSSID-Assisted PSK Discovery (CAPD), brought WPA3-SAE to multi-PSK networks by learning the client's PSK on a WPA2-only companion BSSID and steering the client with IEEE 802.11v to a hidden WPA2/WPA3 primary BSSID of the same SSID. CAPD assumes that the AP can test every PSK itself. This paper removes that assumption. We propose RADIUS-Assisted Companion PSK Discovery (RA-CAPD). The AP forwards the ANonce, the raw EAPOL-Key message 2 (SNonce, MIC, RSNE), the SSID, the client MAC, the BSSID and the AP MAC to the external server in RADIUS vendor-specific attributes (VSAs). The server validates the MIC against all provisioned keys, identifies the matching PSK, and returns it encrypted under the RADIUS shared secret (or a per-AP key for cloud databases), together with the unit, room or user identity and the VLAN. The AP binds the client to this PSK and identity, synchronises the binding across all APs in the domain, and moves the client to the configured profile: 802.11v-capable clients via a BSS Transition Management request, and other clients by disconnection and reconnection. On that profile, SAE-capable clients complete WPA3-SAE and WPA2-only clients complete WPA2-PSK, both with the learned key and no further search, so the companion BSSID serves only for onboarding. We present the design, attribute dictionary, algorithms, complexity and security properties, together with laboratory validation on commercial access points.

Abstract: We study the quantum query complexity of maximizing a non-negative submodular function, considering both the unconstrained setting and, for monotone functions, a cardinality constraint $k$ on an $n$-element ground set. In the exact reversible digital value-oracle model, our unconstrained algorithm achieves an expected $(1/2-\varepsilon)$-approximation using only $O_\varepsilon(\log n)$ queries. In contrast, any classical randomized algorithm that attains a fixed expected ratio above $1/4$ requires $Ω(n/\log n)$ queries (Li, Feldman, Kazemi, and Karbasi, 2022), establishing an exponential separation in query complexity. For cardinality-constrained maximization, we give a bounded-error quantum algorithm that achieves a $(1-1/e-\varepsilon)$-approximation using $\widetilde O_\varepsilon(\min\{\sqrt n,n/k\})$ queries. When $k=o(n)$, our algorithm achieves at least a quadratic speedup up to logarithmic factors over classical randomized algorithms (Mirzasoleiman, Badanidiyuru, Karbasi, Vondrák, and Krause, 2015; Peng and Rubinstein, 2025). Moreover, when $k=cn$ for any fixed rational $c<1-1/e-\varepsilon$, the query complexity reduces to $O_{\varepsilon,c}(\log n)$, yielding an exponential separation from the classical $Ω(n/\log n)$ lower bound (Li, Feldman, Kazemi, and Karbasi, 2022). We further prove quantum lower bounds of $\exp(Ω(\varepsilon^2n))$ queries for achieving a ratio beyond $1/2+\varepsilon$ without constraints, and $\exp(Ω(\varepsilon^2k))$ queries for exceeding $1-1/e+\varepsilon$ when $k/n\le\varepsilon$. These barriers demonstrate that quantum computation offers no exponential speedup at these approximation thresholds.

Abstract: Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) eliminates the central aggregation server, reducing the single point of observation that traditional defenses against attacks rely on. As a result, peer-to-peer networks become exposed to malicious updates containing backdoors or semantic poisoning, since such updates can remain close to benign ones in the parameter space while behaving very differently. This may evade defenses based on passive parameter inspection. However, existing deception-based defenses have mainly been designed for centralized FL and do not jointly address local observation, poisoning propagation, source attribution, and containment in strictly serverless DFL. To address these limitations, this paper presents DecoyTrace, a proactive cyber deception-based defense for strictly serverless DFL environments. DecoyTrace deploys a mobile DecoyNode that generates decoy challenges using chaotic maps, disseminates a dual model (clean vs. decoy) based on neighbor trust, and evaluates them using three-state semantic metrics. Upon confirmation, a distributed protocol isolates the source and performs a model reset or recovery to preserve training progress. Evaluated across sixty configurations on the NEBULA platform (five datasets, three topologies, and four attack/defense scenarios), DecoyTrace systematically restores lost utility. The F1-score remains within 0.03 of the baseline on MNIST/FashionMNIST (mitigating drops of up to 0.37), matches or exceeds the baseline on EMNIST and CIFAR-100, and remains between 0.05 and 0.10 below the baseline on CIFAR-10, the most visually complex convolutional scenario evaluated. Furthermore, containment reduces CPU and network usage by up to two-thirds. These results demonstrate the feasibility of unifying deception, identification, and containment in DFL, while also identifying its limitations in complex tasks and multi-attractor threat models.

Abstract: Graph learning from edge-detecting queries concerns the reconstruction of an unknown edge set on a known vertex set. Each query reports whether a specified vertex subset contains at least one edge. We study non-adaptive schemes, in which all queries are fixed before any outcomes are observed, with the goal of achieving exact recovery using few queries and fast decoding. For general graphs on $n$ vertices with at most $k$ edges, non-adaptive recovery requires $Ω(\min\{k^2\log n,n^2\})$ queries in the worst case, even when a small error probability is allowed. In this paper, we consider Erdős--Rényi ($\mathrm{ER}$) graphs $G\sim \mathrm{ER}(n,q)$, with expected edge count $\bar{k}=q\binom{n}{2}$. Our scheme uses $O(\bar{k}\log n)$ queries and achieves exact recovery in $O(\bar{k}\log n)$ decoding time with probability tending to one throughout the regime $\bar{k}\to\infty$ and $\bar{k}=o(n^2)$. This improves the previous $O(\bar{k}^{1+δ}\log n)$ decoding guarantee for any fixed $δ>0$, while maintaining the same query order. The guarantee also extends beyond the previously studied regime $\bar{k}=Θ(n^{2θ})$ with fixed $θ\in(0,1)$. Our approach builds on the binary splitting method used in prior work, which organizes vertices into a hierarchy of successively smaller groups. We introduce three main changes: (i) we use random affine hash functions over a finite field to process each candidate pair in constant time; (ii) we apply the splitting procedure directly to the full graph, avoiding the need to combine solutions to multiple smaller graph-learning subproblems; and (iii) we bound the total decoding workload directly rather than deriving separate high-probability bounds on candidate counts at each level.

Abstract: We give a deterministic $(8+\varepsilon)$-approximation for minimum dominating set on planar graphs in a constant number of rounds of the LOCAL model, for every $\varepsilon>0$. This improves the previous ratio $11+\varepsilon$ obtained by Heydt et al. The ratio is near-optimal in this model: its leading constant is only one above the known lower bound of $7$. Our result closes three quarters of the previous gap, reducing it from $4$ to $1$. Our main contribution is a sharp structural bound. For any dominating set $D$, assigning each vertex outside $D$ to a neighboring center gives disjoint owner blocks. If $k_x$ counts the other blocks containing a neighbor of $x$, then $\sum_{x\notin D}(k_x-2)^+\le(4|D|-12)^+$, where $z^+=\max\{z,0\}$. The bound holds for every such assignment, and equality holds for arbitrarily large minimum dominating sets. We use this bound in their three-phase framework, with new parameters and the same final linear-programming procedure. The algorithm requires neither a planar embedding nor the graph size, and its round bound depends only on $\varepsilon$. The transfer theorem of Bonamy et al. also gives a deterministic $(25+\varepsilon)$-approximation on graphs of bounded Euler genus, with a round bound depending only on $\varepsilon$ and the genus.

Abstract: Modern networks are large in scale and heterogeneous in configuration, making manual policy management increasingly impractical. Intent-Based Networking (IBN) addresses this by automating the translation of high-level operator goals into low-level network configurations. Yet existing IBN systems rely on static heuristics and fixed-feature classifiers that generalize poorly to distribution shifts such as new service definitions or evolving phrasing in operator requests. Large Language Models (LLMs), with strong reasoning and translation capabilities demonstrated across many domains, are a natural candidate for IBN policy generation. However, it is unclear whether LLMs can be reliably applied to this task, nor whether their use mitigates or worsens the underlying security risk. In this work, we show that while fine-tuned LLMs excel at intent translation, they exhibit false negative rates when checking whether a proposed intent violates an existing security policy. The root cause is not a lack of logical reasoning capability, but LLMs lack of persistent grounding in network topology and group hierarchy. Motivated by this finding, we introduce NetInspector, a three-layer agentic framework that enforces a verify-then-act protocol, decoupling information retrieval from reasoning so that the LLM focuses on symbolic reasoning while every policy decision is grounded in verifiable network facts retrieved from a live Environment Layer before approval. On NetInspector-Bench, a 2,224-sample synthetic benchmark spanning campus, enterprise, and WAN topologies, NetInspector reduces FNR by over 30\% relative to ungrounded baselines and remains robust under linguistic distribution shifts.

Abstract: Given a team of agents on the nodes of a graph-based network, the exploration problem requires each node to be visited by at least one agent. In the classical distributed setting of static networks, agents do not know the topology of the network; in the more recently investigated setting of dynamic networks, they may have prior knowledge about the graph class (e.g., trees, tori, rings) or other parameters (e.g., number of nodes). Gotoh et al. (2021) are the first to study the exploration problem of arbitrary dynamic networks, under the necessary minimal assumption that any two nodes will be connected by a temporal path infinitely often (temporal connectivity assumption). In this paper, we extend their study of exploration under temporal connectivity by considering dangerous dynamic networks, i.e., containing possibly one or more black holes. Whenever an agent enters a black hole, it will be trapped forever. The safe exploration problem requires a team to explore all the safe nodes, ensuring that at least one agent will never be trapped in a black hole. We first prove that, given the necessary (and sufficient) number of agents, a team of oblivious agents can perpetually explore the safe nodes without any prior knowledge of the network or the team, without agent or node IDs, under semi-synchronous schedulers. Then, we provide an algorithm that enables agents to safely explore the network and terminate. In this case, agents are equipped with unique IDs and persistent memory, and they know the number of safe nodes. Yet, in both cases, we prove that it is impossible for a team of agents on dynamic networks to correctly mark only the ports leading to black holes.