Papers for
municipal planners
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Civic AI helps communities weigh data center environmental impacts
EJAI: Judgment-Preserving Civic AI for Data Center Environmental Justice
Abstract: Communities in the United States and around the world are contesting data centers, the physical infrastructure of AI. These disputes pose environmental justice issues: residents must weigh unevenly distributed burdens using evidence scattered across metrics, corporate claims, policy documents, and public testimony. A formative study with 10 users showed that dashboards and single-agent AI can settle questions before people examine that evidence. Here we present EJAI, a source-grounded system that links an interactive map, retrieved evidence, missing-data statements, and two stakeholder personas that allow people to inspect evidence and form their own policy recommendations. In a small functional benchmark of 21 queries, retrieved evidence supported 98.4% of factual claims and the system acknowledged missing evidence in 32 of 33 cases. Persona alignment carried a grounding cost: the Corporate Executive omitted some evidence that conflicted with its assigned priorities. In a within-subjects study, 15 participants acting as residents prepared for a simulated town hall. Some checked cited AI claims while treating map metrics as official, some made conditional recommendations with safeguards such as water-use disclosure, and some found the personas simplified or biased. Our results suggest that civic AI can support preparation for public reasoning when it makes evidence, gaps, and disagreement open to inspection, and that corpus imbalance and two-sided personas remain open justice concerns.
New fairness rules extend voter influence to complex preferences
Robust Proportionality Axioms for Additive Utilities
Abstract: We study the model of participatory budgeting, in which a subset of candidates is selected subject to a budget constraint. Voters express their preferences by assigning a numerical utility to each candidate. Our focus is on formal analysis of proportionality, a central notion of fairness in multi-winner elections. Intuitively, proportionality means that each group of voters should influence the election outcome roughly in proportion to its size. Recent "plus" axioms of proportionality are particularly appealing notions: they are verifiable in polynomial time, and they provide strong representation guarantees without requiring groups of voters to have cohesive preferences. However, their existing formulations are restricted to approval-based preferences. We generalise extended justified representation plus (EJR+), and Core plus (Core+) to general additive utilities. Our approach builds on a payment-based interpretation of proportionality: candidates' costs are shared among their supporters, with the aim of balancing voters' total payments.