Papers for

marketplace platform operators

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Optimal pricing strategies for intermediaries in repeated trade scenarios

Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade

Abstract: Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder, in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to arbitrarily high dimensions.

Fri 6 NovComputer Science and Game TheoryMachine Learning
The gist
Setting prices for buying from sellers and selling to buyers can be tricky when you don’t know how much people value the items. This paper studies a situation where a middleman posts prices and only sees if trades happen, not the actual buyer or seller values. The authors show that learning the best prices on both sides is just as hard as learning on one side alone. They created an algorithm that nearly matches the best possible learning speed known for simpler one-sided cases, suggesting no extra difficulty in pricing both sides together.
Open → 2611.09558v1