Abstract: Recent work shows that LLM-based pricing agents can produce supracompetitive outcomes in repeated oligopoly environments without being explicitly instructed to collude. We reproduce the qualitative prompt-sensitivity effect of Fish et al. using DeepSeek-V3.1: the P1 prompt produces significantly higher prices and profits than P2, although our outcomes are less monopoly-like than the original GPT-4 results. We then evaluate three regulatory interventions: a prompt-only warning, a Harrington-inspired expected-damages payoff regulator, and an active random entrant. The prompt-only regulator reduces but does not eliminate above-Nash pricing. The Harrington regulator brings P1 outcomes close to the duopoly Nash benchmark and removes the statistically significant P1--P2 gap. The active entrant produces the strongest effect, pushing both prompts below the appropriate random-entrant Nash benchmark. Overall, our experiments provide preliminary evidence that interventions that alter incentives or market participation can reduce supracompetitive pricing more effectively than prompt warnings alone.