Papers for
market operators
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
State aligned order flow interventions improve low risk trading costs
When and How Order-Flow Interventions Work After Dealers Adapt
Abstract: Learning dealer agents can settle on persistently wide quotes, raising what customers pay to trade. A venue can route more orders to tighter quotes, but a wide quote may reflect real risk, and once dealers adapt, an end-to-end comparison cannot show why a rule works: because it intervenes more, picks better moments, is announced in advance, or rewards the right quote. We propose SOFA (State-aligned Order-Flow Allocation), a public order-flow contract with three parts: a State Scorer ranks market states from lagged public data, a Commitment Scheduler announces a budgeted intervention strength before dealers quote, and a Quote-to-Flow Allocator shifts a bounded share of fixed customer demand toward tighter quotes. Our paired re-adaptation protocol gives competing rules the same intervention strengths, only re-timed, lets dealers re-adapt to each rule from a shared checkpoint, and breaks one link at a time. Across 20 independently trained dealer populations in an ABIDES market, concentrating the intervention in states that the score ranks as low-risk lowers low-risk execution cost relative to random timing in every population, by 0.040 tick on average, while a stale announcement or a broken quote-to-flow link raises this cost. In the primary setting the gain comes at the expense of high-risk trades, whose costs rise, so state alignment pays off only for a venue that weighs low-risk costs more than 1.38 times as heavily as high-risk costs. Our code is available at https://github.com/moderncavemann/state-aligned-order-flow-contracts.
Polymarket weather forecasts bias shifts from longshots to favorites over time
Time-Varying Favorite-Longshot Bias in Polymarket Weather Markets
Abstract: Prediction-market prices combine traders' judgments about future outcomes, but their errors may be concentrated in particular price ranges and change as settlement approaches. Prior cross-category evidence shows that Polymarket weather markets have larger pricing bias than other major categories, without separating low-price longshots from high-price favorites. This study compares the two ranges at different horizons in daily maximum-temperature markets. Event-level probability scores, cubic B-spline recalibration, and Buy-NO tests are used to examine the form and effect of the bias. Longshot overpricing mainly occurs at distant horizons, whereas favorite overpricing becomes much stronger during the final 1-12 hours and is nearly one order of magnitude larger. Event-level scores improve toward the daily temperature peak, while simple recalibration yields no statistically significant gains. The Buy-NO results in the corresponding time windows also show that the main pricing error is concentrated at the favorite end.