Papers for

market maker teams

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Market maker strategies shape bid ask spreads in volatile assets

Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making

Abstract: We propose a market-making game played among $N \ge 2$ strategic market makers and a single non-strategic representative trader. In a continuous quote space, standard finite-game arguments do not apply, while non-convex and discontinuous payoffs rule out classical continuous existence results and complicate learning. Nonetheless, we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) and show that at least one PSNE always exists under minimal assumptions on the underlying asset value distribution, and that the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens strictly with asset value volatility. To obtain a tractable learning framework, we discretize prices and, under an additional regularity condition, show that the time-averaged play of no-internal-regret learners approaches the continuous Nash price envelope as the tick size vanishes. Finally, we empirically validate our theoretical results through numerical simulations.

Thu 22 OctComputer Science and Game TheoryMachine Learning
The gist
The paper studies how multiple market makers compete when setting prices for buying and selling financial assets with changing values. The authors show that there is always a stable way for these market makers to set prices so that none wants to change, even though the game is complicated by how prices can vary continuously and payoffs can jump. They find that when asset values are more volatile, the difference between buying and selling prices tends to increase. They also show how simplified models of learning can help market makers approximate these optimal prices over time, with simulations supporting their findings.
Open → 2610.30891v1