Papers for

llm safety engineers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Safety monitor failures can hide evidence from llm decisions

Monitor-Validity Failures: LLM Safety Evidence Paths at Evolving Framework Boundaries

Abstract: Modern LLM applications rely on runtime monitors that inspect tool calls, traces, streams, detector outputs, and verifier inputs. This creates an interface-reliability problem: a framework path may remain operational while policy-relevant evidence never reaches its decision point. In one representative case, a regex detector returned a positive match, but the framework stranded the result before the block decision. This differs from jailbreaks and detector errors because the evidence is already recognized yet disconnected from enforcement. We study this repair-boundary signature with canary contracts: parent/fixed confirmation units that place a known payload only on the changed evidence surface and record monitor visibility together with the downstream decision for action-boundary cases. Applying the protocol to public framework repairs, we confirm 18 evidence-path failures across 11 LLM or agent safety project groups and four implementation ecosystems. Nine are established-boundary repairs, eight are new-surface policy-coverage gaps, and one is a boundary-only evidence case. Fourteen reach E1 enforcement boundaries: seven native action outcomes, six configured enforcement boundaries, and one synthetic-consumer consequence. The remaining cases affect verifier, safety-prompt, or observability channels. The cases form carrier, adapter, authority, and surface families and show how ordinary application behavior can remain intact while a safety-specific evidence path misses its decision. Exact revisions, deterministic outcomes, negative controls, and a frozen prospective audit document the confirmation rule. Monitor assumptions therefore need regression tests at the schemas, streams, tools, and adapters that frameworks evolve.

Fri 16 OctArtificial IntelligenceCryptography and SecuritySoftware Engineering
The gist
Large language models (LLMs) use safety monitors to check and control risky outputs during operation. This paper shows that sometimes the monitors detect a problem, but the warning does not reach the part of the system that decides what to do, meaning unsafe outputs can slip through. The authors found many examples of this issue in real LLM safety frameworks by testing with special test cases that highlight these hidden evidence paths. Their work reveals that safety checks need regular testing and updates as systems evolve to ensure all warnings lead to the right actions.
Open → 2610.23362v1

Large language models get safer at handling multiple harm types

How to Tame a Multi-Headed Hydra? Adaptive Multi-Category Safety Steering for Large Language Models

Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly widespread, preventing unsafe responses to harmful prompts is essential for their safe deployment. Activation steering offers an approach to improving LLM safety by modifying internal activations during inference without updating model parameters. However, a single prompt can involve multiple harm categories, and steering toward safety in one category may leave harmful content from another unaddressed. Despite advances in adaptive steering, existing methods do not explicitly coordinate steering direction and strength when multiple harm categories co-occur within a single prompt. To address this problem, we propose CAM-Steer, a Category-Adaptive Multi-category Safety Steering framework. Specifically, it estimates the risk associated with each harm category by comparing the current hidden state with safe and unsafe prototypes. The estimated risks are then used to combine the safety directions for different harm categories into a single steering direction and to determine the strength of the intervention. Finally, it rotates the hidden state along the composed steering direction, with the rotation angle determined by the estimated risks, while preserving the hidden-state norm. Experiments across three LLM backbones and seven harm categories show that CAM-Steer outperforms the evaluated baselines in average defense success rate, including when categories co-occur. Further analyses support its component designs and informative risk scores, with negligible inference overhead.

Mon 28 SeptCryptography and SecurityComputation and LanguageMachine Learning
The gist
Large language models sometimes respond in unsafe ways when given harmful prompts involving different types of bad content. The authors created a new method called CAM-Steer that helps the models detect multiple kinds of risks at once and adjust their responses to be safer. CAM-Steer looks at the model’s internal state and rotates it in a way that reduces harmful content without changing the model itself. Tests showed CAM-Steer works better than previous methods, especially when different harm types happen together.
Open → 2609.34514v1