iot security engineers

Abstract: Providing autonomous intelligence, pervasive connectivity and usability to human life and industry has led to the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT). To support time-sensitive and resource-constrained applications, IoT systems nowadays increasingly rely on edge computing. This brings computation and decision-making closer to end devices. In edge-enabled IoT architecture, latency and communication overhead are reduced, but interactions among a larger and more diverse set of devices, edge nodes, services, and data sources are introduced as well. In such environments, security and privacy mechanisms provide the foundation for protection, while trust management can assess the reliability of interacting entities and adapting secure decisions. In this paper, we systematically review the current state of trust management in edge-enabled IoT. To this end, we propose a comprehensive taxonomy that maps physical, network, and application architectural IoT layers against the consumer, commercial, industrial, and infrastructure IoT domains. We further investigate state-of-art research based on their trust design, how trust integrated into secure IoT operations, the attacks that effect trust management process. Based on these findings, we identify key gaps in current research and outline future directions for context-aware and adaptive trust management in edge-enabled IoT.

Abstract: Blockchain-enabled Internet of Things (IoT) systems integrate smart contracts with embedded devices to support decentralized device management and access control. Their security therefore depends jointly on the logic of on-chain contracts and off-chain device firmware. Logic flaws in either layer can violate the same system invariants, such as unauthorized access, improper state changes, or unguarded privileged operations. Existing approaches rely on contract analysis, firmware analysis, and graph-based vulnerability detection. However, these methods typically focus on a single layer or artifact and often depend on predefined vulnerability patterns, emulation fidelity, or homogeneous representations that obscure security-relevant component roles. They also lack a unified architecture that supports different security tasks while remaining deployable on resource-constrained gateways. To address these limitations, we extend MA-HGAT into a cross-layer multi-agent heterogeneous graph attention framework that models contracts, firmware artifacts, device fleets, and transaction streams with a unified four-role, nine-relation schema. Role-aligned agents exchange heterogeneous evidence through cross-attention, while graph-, link-, and node-level heads support multiple detection tasks and a role-based gateway--cloud partition enables lightweight edge inference. MA-HGAT thus provides a unified and deployable framework for detecting logic vulnerabilities across the contract and device layers of blockchain-enabled IoT systems.