Papers for
iot device managers
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Packet loss models can miss risks of prolonged update failures
Survival-Time Risk Beyond Low-Order Channel Models: Identifiability and Scheduling
Abstract: This paper investigates whether low-order packet-loss statistics suffice to assess survival-time risk under bursty packet losses, i.e., the probability that no update succeeds for a prescribed number of consecutive slots. Conventional models, such as the Gilbert model, characterize packet losses using the loss rate and mean burst length, but channels sharing these statistics may exhibit substantially different failure risks. We characterize the Markov channels one order above a given low-order fit that share its statistics and analyze their risks under acknowledgment-based scheduling with transmission budgets. We show that, with dense transmission attempts, risk is primarily governed by loss persistence beyond the modeled memory, and the worst-case channel need not be the most persistent one. Under limited budgets, retry spacing makes loss relapse probabilities important and can reverse the risk ordering of compatible channels. Numerical and measurement results show that low-order models can substantially underestimate the risk, highlighting the need for scheduling-dependent channel statistics.
Edge network security improved by governor checks on automated actions
Autonomy in Check: Governor-Mediated Adaptive Security at the Edge
Abstract: Adaptive security at the network edge increasingly relies on automated planners, including rule-based controllers, learned policies, and LLM-assisted agents, that translate observations into enforcement actions. Once such a planner can influence live policy state, syntactic validity is not enough. A semantically wrong action, produced from incomplete or manipulated observations, can be faithfully executed by an enforcement substrate that cannot judge mission context. We address this problem by treating the boundary between planner output and kernel enforcement input as the primary security object. We propose a split-control architecture in which an untrusted planner emits typed security intents, a deterministic governor checks each intent against safety, resource, temporal-stability, and proportionality invariants, and only admitted actions are bound to signed receipts and compiled into pre-installed eBPF map updates. The paper formalizes this trust-boundary problem, defines three threat classes, develops the governor admission predicate, and reports an end-to-end prototype. Across rule-based and LLM-assisted planners on a Raspberry Pi 5 testbed connected to the university 5G Test Network, the governor admits, rejects, and bounds intents at microsecond cost without disrupting protected-flow regularity. The contribution is conceptual as much as empirical: adaptive security does not need to trust the author of an action. It needs a mediation boundary that decides whether the action is admissible.