Papers for

infrastructure regulators

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Graph neural networks improve public infrastructure auction design

Differentiable Combinatorial Auction Design: Optimizing Revenue-Welfare-Fairness Frontiers With Graph Attention Networks

Abstract: Designing optimal auctions for allocating public infrastructure-such as airport slots and energy resources-is challenging due to interdependent resources and complex side-constraints. While the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction guarantees maximum welfare, it cannot maximize revenue or accommodate the multi-objective trade-offs inherent in public infrastructure systems. We propose a differentiable, constraint-aware framework for combinatorial auction design that enables end-to-end learning of fractionally feasible, approximately strategy-proof mechanisms. Our primary contribution is a combinatorial constraint enforcement technique that ensures fractional feasibility by construction, bypassing the need for penalty-based approximations. We introduce CAGraph, a novel graph-based architecture designed to capture dependencies between items and bidders, alongside CANet and CAFormer as deep learning baselines, for combinatorial settings. We also provide a Matching Pursuit-inspired decomposition that maps fractional allocations to feasible discrete allocations and empirically evaluates the resulting discretization gap. In synthetic benchmarks and an airport slot-divestiture case study, respectively, the learned mechanisms achieve up to 73.5% and 180% higher expected revenue than VCG, under small empirical regret. Finally, we visualize the Pareto frontiers for revenue, welfare, and fairness, providing regulators with a decision-support tool to design infrastructure auctions that balance profitability, efficiency and equity.

Thu 22 OctComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Public infrastructure like airport slots needs to be allocated fairly and efficiently, but designing auctions for this is very complex. The authors created a new method using graph-based neural networks to design auctions that better balance revenue, fairness, and overall benefit. Their system learns auction rules that follow rules exactly and are hard to cheat. In tests, their approach raised expected revenue much higher than traditional methods and helps regulators see trade-offs clearly.
Open → 2610.31977v1