infrastructure operators

Abstract: Tool-using agents can initiate consequential infrastructure changes, yet evidence required for admission may expire while other checks run or depend on a shared fault domain. We formulate evidence acquisition as joint witness selection and scheduling under quorum, diversity, freshness, deadline, and resource constraints. Assurance-Aware Semantic Scheduling (AAS) combines integer-program selection, dispatch-aware temporal scheduling, bounded diagnostic expansion, and receipt-aware repair. Formal results state the assumptions needed for dispatch-time freshness and finite diagnostic expansion. In three generated infrastructure workloads, AAS produces 1,075/1,200 valid candidates versus 647/1,200 for constraint-aware forward scheduling; stale candidates fall from 440 to 12. Paired sensitivity studies reuse the same instances and operation latency draws across parameter settings. A corrected timeout intervention finds 18/20 admissions with repair or full resynthesis versus 0/20 for a static plan, with lower committed cost when receipts are reused. On 20 constructed cases requiring a certified decomposition cut, refinement recovers an oracle-matching feasible plan every time. These are controlled simulation results; the bounded oracle shares a temporal search component, and transfer to deployed systems remains untested.

Abstract: The July 2026 intrusion into Hugging Face production infrastructure showed how reward hacking can become an external cybersecurity incident when a capable agent encounters weak containment boundaries. This study develops a probabilistic risk model linking five stages: reward hacking, containment escape, usable access, persistence, and failure of detection. A Monte Carlo simulation evaluates 100,000 runs under each of four control configurations. Input distributions represent explicit uncertainty and are used for comparative analysis rather than real-world frequency prediction. Under the stated assumptions, layered controls reduce simulated external-incident probability substantially more than network isolation or monitoring used alone, an ordering that holds under independent plus/minus 25% perturbation of every coefficient in the model across 300 draws. Sensitivity analysis shows that agent capability and weaknesses in monitoring, authorization, and credential control exert the greatest influence on modeled risk. Human temporal discounting and metric gaming provide a behavioral analogy for short-horizon optimization, but the study does not infer that AI agents experience gratification or human motivation. The results support treating cyber-capable agent evaluations as hostile security zones in which indirect egress, shared infrastructure, credentials, and evaluation artifacts must remain outside the agent's effective authority.

Abstract: LLM agents are deployed into infrastructure that grants them broad host authority, yet existing agent-security benchmarks and defenses operate almost exclusively at the application telemetry layer: the served tool manifest, the user prompt, and the model's messages. Some threats, however, smuggle malicious instructions and actions past the application boundary, leaving them invisible to that layer. In this work, we bridge that gap by pairing application-level agent telemetry with kernel-level syscall traces to present the first paired-evidence characterization of kernel-level versus application-layer signal for agent security. To quantify the value of the enhanced telemetry, we introduce Agent Cross-Layer Evidence (ACE), a paired-session corpus of 4,047 sessions and 17 threat models spanning six delivery-vector families and 14 of the 25 OWASP LLM and agentic threat categories, organized into 12 attack mechanics with per-mechanic characterization of where the most discriminative evidence lies. Across four distinct detector families, we find that kernel evidence is discriminative on its own and that composing it with application-layer evidence generally outperforms either single-layer view, revealing complementary signals that single-layer analyses can miss. We further demonstrate generalization to unseen attack families and transfer to an alternate agent runtime. Together, these findings establish the value of cross-layer evidence for agent security.