Papers for

identity and access management teams

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Distributed agent gateways cannot confirm revocation at receipt

Revocation Is Not Complete at Receipt: An Executable Outcome Contract for Distributed Agent-Tool Gateways

Abstract: Distributed agent workflows cache delegated authority at tool gateways. Revocation may be reported at issuer commit, transport acknowledgment, or receiver persistence, although none of these observations establishes that all gateways enforced the change or that guarded effects stopped. We define C0-C5, a bounded outcome contract spanning issuer commit through effect prevention, and implement it as a persistent monitor over a frozen gateway set, call set, and observation window. A 14-case fault matrix checks conservative classification, sticky violations, restart persistence, and evidence immutability. In a derived audit of its eight semantic cases, treating C3 or C4 as completion produces seven or five false positives, respectively; the bounded C0-C5 verdict produces none. Descriptive scaling covers 1,024 gateways and 10,000 effect vectors. The primary experiment uses the maintained Keycloak 26.7 identity server and measures the contract across two durable receivers, eight physical agent-tool gateways, Filesystem and PostgreSQL effects, and 16 AWS hosts in three availability zones. Normal delivery and recovery commit no effects. Under receiver-selective non-delivery, transport acknowledgment and receiver persistence still succeed, but 112 of 225 calls (49.78%) are admitted, and all 112 effects commit in every treatment block. A separately provisioned execution repeats the result. OPA/Toxiproxy and a live three-role LLM workflow with networked MCP tools reproduce the persisted-but-not-enforced boundary on narrower surfaces. Finally, an unmodified external MCPMark agent executes 60 closed-loop task arms. Normal C4 denies all 31 exposed post-barrier calls and commits no effect; selective C3 allows 344 calls and commits 145 effects across Filesystem and PostgreSQL. Transport success is therefore evidence of progress, not a revocation-completion verdict.

Sun 11 OctArtificial IntelligenceCryptography and Security
The gist
When software agents delegate permissions to tools across different systems, canceling or revoking that permission can be tricky to verify. The authors explain that just because a message saying "revoke access" was received doesn't mean all systems actually stopped using that permission. They define a detailed contract spanning several stages to better detect when revocation is truly enforced. Their tests with many gateways and effects show that relying on receipt acknowledgments alone causes false positives, while their contract avoids this mistake. This means revocation must be tracked beyond just initial receipt for accurate enforcement.
Open → 2610.15991v1