government regulators

Abstract: Human oversight is widely held to mitigate the risks of AI systems. Even for systems that produce discrete outputs at identifiable decision points, the realisation of human oversight as a reactive measure is empirically fragile, yet increasingly well understood. However, for agentic AI -- systems that plan, decompose goals, and execute multi-step actions over extended horizons -- reactive oversight reaches its structural limits: intervention on individual actions defeats the autonomy that motivates the deployment, while intervention on aggregate patterns is too coarse for harms whose cumulative consequences only become legible after the fact. This paper argues that reactive oversight must be complemented by an anticipatory mode: oversight exercised before the agent acts, by specifying the normative agenda that structures the space of permissible action and refining it iteratively through specification, runtime, and inspection. The two are complements -- the agenda's escalation conditions specify when reactive intervention is invoked. Drawing on Meaningful Human Control, we read anticipatory oversight as the operationalisation of distal-reason tracking. In addition, we argue that the proposed framework yields a specific responsibility architecture by design: occupying the anticipatory mode is the discharge of a role-grounded prospective obligation, and backward-looking responsibility takes the form of strict moral answerability -- rationalistic, relational, and holding regardless of fault, in virtue of the principal's prior opportunity for precaution. We develop bridging failure modes, address objections including moral luck and the illusion of control, and close with regulatory, architectural, and empirical implications

Abstract: Environmental controversies in global supply chains pose significant risks for global buyers. This study examines whether overseas suppliers' exposure to buyers' artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled environmental governance reduces supplier environmental controversies. Drawing on organizational information processing theory and signaling theory, we investigate how suppliers' exposure to AI-enabled governance influences their environmental controversies and the institutional contingencies under which this effect varies. Using text analysis to measure buyer AI-enabled environmental governance, we analyze panel data on 2,505 suppliers of U.S.-listed firms across 41 countries from 2020 to 2024 with multidimensional fixed-effects models. We find that suppliers' exposure to buyer AI-enabled environmental governance is negatively associated with supplier environmental controversies in the following year. This negative relationship is stronger in supplier countries with higher AI readiness and regulatory quality. The study contributes to research on AI-enabled sustainability governance and sustainable supply chain risk management.