energy market operators

Abstract: We study the route-set allocation problem between end nodes in capacity-constrained flow networks with transfer costs. We introduce an origin--destination (OD) bidding language, in which a participant bids for bounded conic combinations of inlet--outlet--quantity licences and the mechanism performs the routing through a network-flow optimising winner-determination problem. We then study payment rules for the OD mechanism. Under a restricted model with openly and uniformly priced sources and bidders who are indifferent to the source of the gas, the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) payment is core-stable; the key structural fact is that in this regime some optimal aggregate flows never use a physical pipe in both directions, so the winner-determination problem reduces to a single-commodity network flow whose value is submodular in the set of active bidders. If source access is allowed to depend on the individual consumer -- a realistic feature, e.g. when gas deals are embedded in bilateral political bargaining -- the reduction fails and VCG payments may lie strictly outside the core. For this general model we propose a dual (nodal) pricing rule derived from the shadow prices of the flow-conservation constraints, and prove it is always core-stable, at the cost of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. Illustrative examples accompany each result.

Abstract: We study the strategic design of learning algorithms in a canonical continuous-time pricing game. We introduce a meta-game in which firms select learning rates for a gradient dynamic, evaluating payoffs as the discounted sum of profits accrued along the entire learning path. We uncover a fundamental dichotomy driven by stage-game incentives: if the stage game exhibits strategic substitutability, firms unambiguously prefer the fastest possible algorithms to rapidly exploit a gradually adjusting opponent. Under strategic complementarity, however, an excessively fast algorithm accelerates the rival's competitive response, destroying transitional profit margins. Even though the competitive price is a strictly dominant action in the underlying stage game, we prove that firms optimally design sluggish algorithms, extracting surplus during a prolonged convergence to the competitive equilibrium.

Abstract: European electricity trading in the EU operates as a constrained multi-layer system in which legal design, exchange microstructure, and network physics are executed jointly across forward, day-ahead, intraday, and balancing horizons. This paper develops a functional architecture for AI-supported trading that is aligned with market-coupling mechanics, cross-zonal transfer constraints, and compliance obligations under REMIT, MiFID II, MiFIR, and EMIR. The contribution is a formal system specification composed of a decision-state vector, residual-exposure accounting, constrained optimization objective, executable-action permission gate, and fail-closed AI control logic with auditable records. The analysis maps major Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) venues and related exchange operators into an operational venue topology and identifies where cross-border coordination fails in practice: interface-level timing, permission heterogeneity, and balancing-layer coupling. The resulting framework proposes how AI can be deployed as a bounded decision component inside regulated market operation with explicit governance, rather than as an unconstrained prediction layer.