Papers for

email security vendors

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Tool-using AI agents get safer decision checks against prompt attacks

SPILLWAY: Separating Target Admission from Sanitization to Defend Tool-Using Agents against Prompt Injection

Abstract: Tool-using agents act on email, files, and payments, so an instruction hidden in a web page or a shared document can make an agent send data or money to an attacker. Many runtime defenses put a language model on the decision that lets an action through, so the decision depends on a model that may read the attacker's text and adds model calls to every step. Provenance defenses keep the model off the final check but need a model to plan or route each task first. Where an action goes can instead be read from the tools' typed returns: an email's sender or a payment's account arrives in a typed field, while injected instructions arrive as free text. SPILLWAY turns this observation into a deterministic floor with no per-task plan. The check admits a call when each target value that appears in tool output but not in the user's task was returned by a read-only tool in a typed field or is covered by a fixed delegation rule. A deterministic sanitizer removes instruction-like regions its fixed rules match before the model reads them and retains the removed spans as evidence, and a local judge may restore a refused call, never one whose target lies in the removed text. Across three backbones, and seven task suites on one of them, no standard templated injection redirects an action to an attacker's target under SPILLWAY, at the highest observed mean utility and composite scores (NRP, ERS) of the defenses we run under that attack. A forged chat template also produces a raw zero, and mean in-scope attack success under a released reinforcement-learning attacker is .007. SPILLWAY reaches this floor with no defense-triggered backbone re-run and almost no added model call. As personal AI agents act on users' email, files, and payments, SPILLWAY gives them an auditable refusal floor on where their actions go that keeps them useful and holds across backbones.

Wed 4 NovCryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence
The gist
People use AI agents to help manage emails, files, and payments, but bad actors can trick these agents by hiding sneaky instructions inside normal-looking text. The authors created SPILLWAY, a method that separates deciding where an action should go from checking for harmful instructions. SPILLWAY uses clear rules to catch suspicious instructions before the AI reads them and only allows actions when the target information is safe and comes from trusted sources. This approach reduces the chance that attackers can redirect payments or emails and keeps the AI agents helpful without slowing them down.
Open → 2611.07222v1