Papers for

email security teams

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Reddit signals slightly improve email spam detection for rare domains

Reddit Community Signals as a Supplementary Domain-Reputation Feature in Spam Classification: A Conservative Controlled Evaluation

Abstract: Email spam and phishing remain persistent threats, and purely algorithmic classifiers may struggle with unfamiliar senders, evolving message content, and cold-start domains. This study evaluates whether Reddit-derived community signals can serve as a supplementary domain-reputation feature in email spam classification. We use a preprocessed SpamAssassin-derived corpus of 5,582 emails and compare three feature configurations: (1) a baseline using TF-IDF and structural features; (2) a traditional-enhanced configuration adding urgency and action scores; and (3) a Reddit-enhanced configuration adding a binary discussion-presence indicator, a keyword-based Reddit score, and an urgency-Reddit interaction term. We train Logistic Regression, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine models. In the preliminary single-split evaluation, the Random Forest model with Reddit-enhanced features achieves 97.94% accuracy, a 0.55 percentage-point improvement over the baseline, although the improvement is not statistically significant in the primary test split. Logistic Regression performance declines when additional features are introduced, and the SVM performs poorly and is treated as a negative control. Reddit signals appear most informative for rare domains, but approximately 70% of emails receive no Reddit-derived signal. Because the Reddit data are temporally later than the email corpus, we do not interpret the results as evidence of real-time detection. Instead, the study provides a conservative evaluation of community-derived signals as a supplementary, asynchronous domain-reputation feature and identifies the additional validation required before production deployment, including domain-grouped validation, temporally aligned contemporary data, and adversarial robustness testing.

Sun 1 NovCryptography and Security
The gist
Spam emails are hard to spot, especially when they come from new or uncommon senders. The authors tested if information from Reddit discussions could help better identify spam by adding clues about how often certain domains appear in the community. They found that including these Reddit-based signals improved spam detection accuracy a little bit for less common domains but didn’t make a big difference overall. The study shows this extra information could be useful but needs more testing before it’s reliable enough to use in real-time spam filtering.
Open → 2611.01813v1

Email address presentation varies widely on computer science homepages

Beyond "[at]": A Large-Scale Measurement of Email Address Presentation on Computer Science Scholars' Homepages

Abstract: Publishing an email address makes a scholar reachable, but also exposes it to automated collection. Yet how email addresses are presented on the Web has not been measured systematically across their content, form, and location. We measure it across 32,413 homepage records of computer-science scholars listed in CSRankings with MailScope, which preserves raw and rendered HTML, extracts addresses with a three-stage cascade (rules, then large language models, then a crawling agent), and labels each address. Among 19,517 reachable homepages, we find an address for 17,712 scholars (90.8%). Our measurement yields four main findings. (i) Presentation is diverse: only 53.8% publish plain content, the others spread over 23 subtypes of symbol substitution, code, and semantic description, and 5.5% of scholars' addresses appear only after rendering. (ii) Presentation follows hosts rather than individuals: scholars on one host share a content class in 67.9% of pairs, compared with 38.8% across hosts of one institution, whereas research output and institution rank are barely related to presentation. (iii) Content and form are coupled through code-based links, and 6.2% of scholars with non-plain selected presentations have plain-text copies of the same address elsewhere. (iv) Plain addresses are more common behind passed bot challenges, and 36.1% of redirecting homepages no longer lead to scholars. Human assessment yields 94.4% weighted exact-set agreement on 143 judgeable pages, complemented by three 500-page review rounds with human verification. Presentation is diverse but clusters by shared host, and by our label-based estimate plain-string matching misses nearly half of the addresses.

Mon 26 OctInformation Retrieval
The gist
Publishing email addresses on personal web pages helps people reach scholars but makes the addresses vulnerable to being collected by automated tools. This study looked at over 32,000 computer science scholars' homepages and found that almost half use ways to hide or change their displayed email addresses to protect them. The way email addresses are shown is more influenced by the website host than by individual scholars or their institutions. The authors also found that simple text searches miss nearly half of all email addresses due to these variations.
Open → 2610.35499v1

Llm email agents fail to detect and resist adaptive phishing attacks

AgentPhishing: A Benchmark of LLM Email Agents Under Adaptive Attack

Abstract: Computer-use agents increasingly handle private information and act on users' behalf across desktop and web applications, including email. Phishing therefore poses privacy and security risks that depend not only on whether agents recognize malicious messages, but also on how they respond. Existing phishing datasets were developed primarily for conventional detection, leaving agent susceptibility to persuasive malicious requests insufficiently characterized. To expose vulnerabilities that pre-existing datasets may miss, we introduce AgentPhishing, a benchmark for evaluating whether persuasive phishing attacks can evade detection and induce LLM email agents to comply with malicious requests. We develop PhishOpt, which optimizes reusable email-generation skills against individual agents under fixed benchmark constraints and a realism constraint. We analyze the generated emails using Cialdini's persuasion principles to identify strategies associated with agent failures and use these findings to construct a universal generation skill. Our evaluation shows that agents can handle pre-existing phishing emails safely yet remain susceptible to attacks adapted to agent behavior, while in an AgentPhishing evaluation of nine agents, four exhibit phishing-detection rates below $10\%$ and malicious-request compliance rates above $45\%$. These results highlight the limits of inferring agent safety from conventional phishing evaluations and the need to assess how agents respond to persuasive malicious requests.

Thu 22 OctCryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Phishing is a trick to get people or computers to reveal private information or do something harmful. The authors created a new test called AgentPhishing that checks if smart email assistants using AI can be fooled by phishing tricks that are specially designed to fool them. They found that some assistants can easily be tricked and will follow harmful requests even if they detect the phishing. The study shows that old tests for phishing don’t catch these new sneaky attacks and it is important to test how these AI agents behave when they get tricky phishing emails.
Open → 2610.31404v1

Jev judges AI safety tasks better than LLMs but misses some phishing

Same Attack, Different Judge: A First Controlled Adversarial Comparison of Jev, LLM Judges, and Purpose-Built Safety Classifiers

Abstract: TypeSafe AI's Jev is a new kind of safety judge. It generates no text and no label: it answers questions the developer defines in advance and returns a probability for each answer. The vendor admits that adversarial input can change these answers but gives no numbers. In this paper, we present the first controlled adversarial evaluation of Jev. We build a test harness that sends every system the same payload under the same policy, and run it on four public-data tasks, from rule-based ones (input moderation, injection detection, routing) to a judgment-based one (phishing detection), with fifty attack variants from thirteen families. The targets are Jev, five GPT and GLM judges, and two local classifiers (Llama Guard 3, Prompt Guard 2). We find that Jev is the most robust system on input moderation: eight forgeries of its structured input bypass none of its decisions, and a sentence asking only why someone might make a harmful request bypasses 9% of its blocks, against 56% for GPT-6 Astra. On phishing detection. However, the same forgeries bypass 19-29% of the emails it flags, and even without attack Jev detects only 62% of phishing emails, against 77-81% for the GLM judges. Jev is also the fastest judge, but it flags the most benign requests (27%). The local classifiers fail differently: a training-example statement makes Llama Guard 3 miss 62% of the phishing it had flagged. These results suggest that Jev resists attacks on tasks with a clear rule to check but is more exposed on tasks that call for an overall judgment.

Tue 13 OctCryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Sometimes AI systems must decide if inputs are harmful or safe. The authors tested a new AI judge called Jev alongside several others by sending them tricky, harmful inputs. They found that Jev was very good at spotting rule-based problems, like harmful requests, but it was not as good at recognizing phishing emails as some other judges. Jev also runs faster but sometimes flags safe inputs incorrectly. This testing helps show where each system works best and where they still have weaknesses.
Open → 2610.17820v1

ConformalGuard controls false positives for language model actions

ConformalGuard: False-Positive-Controlled Action Gating for LM Classifiers

Abstract: Language model classifiers are increasingly deployed for high-stakes decisions such as phishing screening, content moderation, and fraud triage, yet validation-set thresholds provide no finite-sample control of deployment-time false positives. We present ConformalGuard, a model-agnostic calibration layer that wraps a fixed scoring function with finite-sample control over the rate at which legitimate inputs trigger an intervention tier. Our contribution is empirical and operational, not a new conformal theorem: zero-shot LM API scores can be coarse enough (10--11 unique values here) to make temperature scaling and isotonic regression operationally identical to raw thresholding for low-FPR action gating. We compare these methods with conformal calibration for fine-tuned BERT, Claude Sonnet 4, and GPT-4o on public email corpora. For Claude, conformal calibration reduces FPR from 0.040 to 0.008 while recall falls from 0.938 to 0.875. For deterministic GPT-4o scores, the 1% operating point is too conservative to deploy (recall 0.564); three-run stochastic averaging raises recall to 0.732 at FPR 0.005. At 2% prevalence with BERT, conformal calibration removes 25 false-positive reviews per 10,000 emails (95% CI [10, 43]). The guarantee is legitimate-event-rate control under exchangeability; discrimination, workload effects, and robustness to shift remain empirical.

Fri 9 OctMachine Learning
The gist
Making decisions using language models can sometimes wrongly flag safe inputs as risky, causing unnecessary actions. The paper presents ConformalGuard, a method that wraps around existing language model classifiers to better control how often these false warnings happen, even with limited data. The authors show this method can reduce false alarms while still catching most true problems across different language models. This helps make automated decisions more reliable for tasks like email screening and content moderation.
Open → 2610.14365v1

Phishing emails use varied themes but mainly urge clicking links

A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Modern Phishing Email Content

Abstract: Phishing remains one of the most pervasive threats to Internet users, and email remains its predominant delivery channel. Email content is the attack surface of phishing: it is what the victim reads and what automated defenses inspect. Yet the composition of modern phishing content is poorly measured. Prior work has characterized dimensions such as theme, call-to-action (CTA), and impersonation, but not at scale, and their associations and temporal changes remain unclear, owing to small or source-specific corpora, bag-of-words topic models, and a focus on text alone. We present a content-focused measurement study of 2.9M distinct real-world phishing emails collected over 13 months (June 2025 - June 2026) in collaboration with the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). We treat each email as a composite artifact comprising message text and its attachments: 272K images, 143K PDFs, and 57K calendar invitations. Using an LLM pipeline validated against human-annotated samples, we analyze these components along three dimensions (theme, CTA, and impersonation), examine the associations among them, and measure longer-term change against a historical dataset. We find that attackers diversify what they use to deceive but converge on how victims should respond: no theme exceeds 21.3% of emails, while a single CTA, URL navigation, accounts for 73.0%. CTA and impersonation choices are conditioned on theme. Attachments play three roles: images supplement the message text, PDFs substitute for it by carrying the pretext, and calendar invitations reinforce it by replicating interaction endpoints into a persistent medium. Over the longer term, the dominant CTA for invoice-themed phishing shifted from URL navigation to offline communication, rising from 6.7% in 2015 to 46.9% in 2025.

Fri 25 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
Phishing emails trick people by pretending to be trustworthy sources, and most come through email. This study by the authors looked closely at nearly 3 million real phishing emails to understand what these messages say and how they try to fool victims. They found that while phishing emails cover many topics, most of them ask people to click on a link. The study also shows how attackers use images, PDFs, and calendar invites in different ways to support their tricks, and how phishing tactics have shifted over time.
Open → 2609.30683v1

Email agents detect prompt injection attacks by modeling attack stages

Prompt Injection Detection for Email Agents Through Attack Chain Modeling

Abstract: Large language model email assistants are particularly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because untrusted email content can be retrieved into the model context and influence subsequent tool use. Existing prompt injection detectors mainly formulate this problem as binary malicious text classification, which overlooks the important factor that harmful agent behavior often arises through a sequence of stages. We propose a detection framework that models this attack chain by combining a text detector, verifiers specific to each stage, explicit rule-based risk signals, user intent and action consistency analysis, and a logistic decision policy. To support this framework, we derive attack chain labels from prompt injection datasets, evaluate the proposed framework under random splits, temporal phase transfer, conditional stage transfer, cross-dataset transfer, and conduct ablation studies on multiple benchmarks. Results show that random train test splits substantially overestimate robustness under distribution shift, while later tool argument stages are more predictable than earlier stages in the framework. We also show that training on harmless emails that resemble attacks helps reduce false alarms while preserving the ability to detect real attacks. Across five binary benchmarks, our framework achieves a mean F1 score of 0.406 under the strict threshold setting policy, compared with 0.216 for the strongest of five pretrained detectors evaluated without additional training. These results highlight the value of combining attack stage predictions with checks for conflicts between the user's request and instructions in retrieved emails. Our experiments also demonstrate the importance of training with challenging benign examples to balance attack detection and false alarms.

Fri 25 SeptCryptography and SecurityComputation and Language
The gist
Large language model email assistants can be tricked by harmful instructions hidden inside emails. The authors developed a method that watches for these tricks by looking at the attack as a series of steps, not just spotting bad words. Their method combines text checks, rules, and user behavior analysis to catch suspicious activity. They found that training the system with tricky but safe emails helps reduce false alarms while still detecting real attacks.
Open → 2609.30657v1

Clipping improves detecting AI-generated text even with editing errors

Robust Detection of LLM-Generated Text under Contamination

Abstract: We study the detection of LLM-generated text under editing and contamination. Modeling human and machine text as finite-order Markov processes with Huber contamination, we characterize an exact boundary for reliable detection under our assumptions. Detection is impossible when contamination is sufficiently large relative to clean-source separation. Below this boundary, a collection of clipped likelihood-ratio tests achieves vanishing worst-case errors. This construction motivates clipping as a simple modification of existing statistical detectors. For a broad class of additive scores, we identify conditions under which the clipped test is consistent while the raw test's worst-case power tends to zero. We evaluate seven detectors across three datasets and three generation models, and on the RAID benchmark. Clipping improves robustness in both studies, with gains varying across detectors and contamination settings. For example, at a target false-positive rate of 5\%, clipping improves the log-likelihood--log-rank ratio (LRR) detector's true-positive rate by a median of 8.3 percentage points in the controlled study and 2.1 and 4.3 points in rate- and attack-specific RAID evaluations, respectively.

Thu 24 SeptMachine Learning
The gist
Detecting whether text is written by a human or an AI can be tricky when the AI-generated text is altered or mixed with other content. The authors studied this problem by modeling both human and machine text with a mathematical tool and found the limits where detection is possible. They show that by modifying existing detection tests with a simple 'clipping' step, the tests become more reliable against tricky edits or contamination. Their experiments on several datasets and models confirm that clipping consistently improves the ability to spot AI-generated text while keeping false alarms low.
Open → 2609.29935v1

Gmail extension detects Nigerian fintech phishing with sender checks and AI

A Gmail-Based Phishing Detection Prototype for Nigerian Fintech Emails Using Sender Checks and BiLSTM Classification

Abstract: Phishing emails that impersonate Nigerian fintech providers can combine deceptive sender addresses, lookalike links, and locally familiar language. This study presents a Gmail browser extension that integrates sender-domain and URL checks with a bidirectional long short-term memory (BiLSTM) classifier. The extension compares visible sender addresses and links with profiles for eight fintech platforms, obtains a phishing probability from a locally hosted Flask service, and displays a legitimate, warning, or phishing verdict when an email is opened. The BiLSTM classifier was evaluated on 8,943 test messages from a cleaned dataset of 59,622 phishing and legitimate emails. The test confusion matrix recorded 4,308 true negatives, no false positives, one false negative, and 4,634 true positives. These counts correspond to 99.99% accuracy, 100.00% precision, 99.98% recall, and 99.99% F1 score. Tokenized sequence analysis identified 5.79% overlap between the training and test sets, which may inflate performance estimates for independent messages. A Gmail demonstration showed the integrated extension producing user-visible verdicts, although the complete system was not evaluated on a labeled test set. The findings establish the feasibility of the implemented prototype while leaving its end-to-end detection performance and generalization to unseen attacks open for further evaluation.

Wed 23 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
Phishing emails trick people by pretending to be from trusted Nigerian fintech companies. The authors made a Gmail extension that checks sender addresses and links, plus uses a special AI model called BiLSTM to spot scam emails. Their tests showed very high accuracy on a large collection of emails, though some data overlap may make the results look better than they are. They demonstrated the extension works in Gmail, but haven’t fully tested it on new unknown phishing emails yet.
Open → 2609.28305v1

Adaptive system improves email spam and phishing detection accuracy

AURA: Adaptive Uncertainty-Routed Analysis for Email Threat Detection

Abstract: Email spam and phishing attacks remain a critical security threat. Adversaries increasingly exploit large language models to craft contextually convincing malicious messages, and existing spam detection systems often struggle to keep pace. Generalization across diverse and evolving attack scenarios is limited, which reduces effectiveness once these systems are deployed in practice. This paper introduces Adaptive Uncertainty-Routed Analysis (AURA), a multimodal email threat detection system that analyzes both the content of an email and its embedded URLs. AURA is built around two layers: the first quantifies prediction uncertainty from a URL classifier, and only ambiguous messages are escalated to a fine-tuned transformer encoder for semantic analysis. The system is evaluated on eight heterogeneous training corpora together with two held-out real-world corpora spanning a decade of adversarial campaigns. AURA reaches a macro F1-score of 0.9858 in-distribution, and on NazPhish-Eval and GuenterTrap-Eval it maintains 0.9502 and 0.9436, respectively, which is evidence of robust generalization under genuine distribution shift.

Thu 17 SeptMachine Learning
The gist
Spam and phishing emails are dangerous because they try to trick people and can be hard to spot. The authors created a new system called AURA that looks closely at both the message and any links inside it. AURA first checks if the link is suspicious and only digs deeper into the email if it’s unsure. This two-step method helps the system better spot tricky emails, even ones it hasn't seen before, making email safer for everyone.
Open → 2609.19873v1

Subspace interaction improves spotting odd words in text efficiently

SIM: Subspace Interaction-based Method for Token-Level Text Anomaly Detection

Abstract: Token-level text anomaly detection, as an emerging trend of text anomaly detection, moves beyond coarse-grained document-level detection by localizing anomalous tokens within text. By providing fine-grained abnormality prediction, token-level text anomaly detection plays a critical role in various real-world applications, such as spam filtering and fake news detection. However, existing methods still rely on the global distance calculation for scoring, during which the local anomaly signals are severely diluted by numerous redundant normal feature dimensions. Moreover, pre-trained language models used in these methods inevitably smooth out surface anomalies, further limiting their effectiveness in token-level anomaly detection. To address these limitations, we propose a Subspace Interaction-based Method (SIM for short) for token-level text anomaly detection. To prevent local signal dilution, SIM adopts a subspace interaction-based anomaly detector, which decouples high-dimensional token embeddings into multiple low-dimensional ones, amplifying localized anomaly signals hidden within specific dimensions. To counteract the over-smoothing effect, we design a hard pseudo-anomaly generation module to construct pseudo-anomalous tokens, simulating the subtle anomalies obscured by semantic smoothing. Also, a probabilistic boundary loss is developed to standardize anomaly scores into statistical distances, effectively enforcing anomalous instances to deviate significantly from the normal distribution center. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of SIM and demonstrate its remarkable efficiency, robustness, and interpretability. The source code is available at: https://github.com/yankehan/SIM-TAD.

Tue 8 SeptMachine Learning
The gist
Detecting unusual or suspicious words inside texts is important for spotting things like spam or fake news. Existing methods often miss these odd words because they get lost when looking at the whole text all at once. The authors propose SIM, a new approach that looks at smaller parts of the word representations to better catch strange signals. They also create fake anomalies to help the system learn what unusual words look like despite smooth language models hiding them. Testing shows SIM works well, is fast, and easy to interpret.
Open → 2609.08200v1