Papers for

electoral system designers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Reverse sequential approval voting offers some fairness in limited cases

Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees

Abstract: We study the Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule (RevSeqPAV) in approval-based committee elections. Despite its historical prominence and practical use, its properties and guarantees are much less understood than those of Sequential PAV. We analyze it along two dimensions: proportional representation (measured by Extended Justified Representation, its approximations, and proportionality degree) and approximation of the maximum PAV score of instances. We first establish strong negative results for general, unrestricted election instances and then identify settings in which the rule provides meaningful fairness and optimization guarantees.

Mon 28 SeptComputer Science and Game TheoryArtificial Intelligence

The gist

Choosing groups fairly when many people approve of different candidates can be tricky. This paper looks closely at a particular voting method called Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting, which hasn’t been studied as much as similar methods. The researchers show that this method doesn’t always produce fair or optimal groups in general. However, they identify specific situations where it does give reasonable fairness and good selections.

Open → 2609.35331v1