e-commerce pricing teams

Abstract: We study the unit-demand pricing problem under \textit{min-buying} behavior, where customers purchase the lowest-priced item that yields non-negative utility. In contrast to the quasi-linear model, we show that uniform pricing becomes substantially more effective under min-buying. First, we study symmetric environments. We show that for min-buying customers with independent and identically distributed valuations, a uniform price across items is optimal. We then extend this optimality result to all valuations drawn from exchangeable and affiliated distributions. However, uniform pricing is not optimal in all symmetric environments: for min-buying customers we construct an exchangeable and non-affiliated valuation distribution for which the gap between uniform pricing and optimal item pricing is logarithmic in the number of items. This gap is tight and matches the worst-case gap in the quasi-linear setting. Next, we consider asymmetric environments in which valuations are independent but not identically distributed. When these valuations are regular and customers are min-buying, we show that a uniform price guarantees approximately 69.86\% of the optimal item-pricing revenue and this is tight. Overall, our results highlight that the value of non-uniform pricing substantially diminishes, and often disappears entirely, under more conservative demand models in which customers engage in satisficing behaviors such as min-buying.

Abstract: Forecasting resale prices of used electronics is critical for subscription-based platforms where pricing errors translate directly into risk. Unlike structured financial markets, second-hand electronics exhibit high volatility, sparse listing histories, and non-normal price dynamics - yet no systematic time-series benchmark exists for this domain. This paper presents the first multi-horizon benchmark of statistical and deep learning forecasting models for used electronics price prediction. We use a large-scale dataset of daily price listings from Polish online marketplaces (January 2022 to March 2025, 100+ smartphone and laptop models) and evaluate eleven models across six horizons from 1 to 365 days, covering classical methods (ARIMA, ETS, Theta), recurrent and convolutional networks (LSTM, TCN), and modern deep architectures (N-BEATS, N-HiTS, TFT, PatchTST, Informer). Three complementary evaluation protocols assess trajectory fitness, one-shot endpoint accuracy, and cross-horizon transfer. N-BEATS achieves the lowest MAPE beyond 30 days, reaching 8.51% at 365 days versus 14.94% for the best statistical baseline - a 43% reduction. At short horizons (1-7 days), all models converge near 0.72% MAPE and the naive baseline remains competitive. A single N-BEATS model trained at 365 days generalizes to all shorter horizons, eliminating the need for horizon-specific models. N-BEATS and N-HiTS also demonstrate superior hyperparameter stability.

Abstract: We study a sequential pricing problem in which a seller jointly posts a price and an advertisement generated by a large language model (LLM). The seller aims to maximize revenue under an unknown product demand that depends on both decisions, while observing only whether each offer leads to a purchase. We propose an online actor-critic algorithm that combines low-rank adaptation (LoRA) of a pretrained LLM with a demand model fitted to available data. At each round, the actor generates an advertisement, and the critic estimates purchase probabilities to guide price selection. Then, the resulting feedback is used to update both the actor and the critic, with the critic's revenue estimates providing a baseline for policy gradient updates of the actor. To evaluate our approach, we develop an evaluation framework with three synthetic demand models and a demand simulator built from real-world marketplace data. Finally, we compare our algorithm with benchmarks that do not jointly optimize price selection and advertisement generation, achieving expected revenue gains over the reference policy of 5.69%, 5.18% and 55.96% under the three synthetic demand models and 5.81% under the marketplace simulator.