Prompt Injection Through Forensic Evidence: A Taxonomy and Proof of Concept of Anti-Forensic Attacks on LLM-Assisted Digital Investigations
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are entering digital forensics as examination assistants and autonomous agents. Digital forensics inverts the usual setting for indirect prompt injection: the evidence under analysis is attacker-controlled by definition, and the examiner is obliged to read it closely. This makes the reasoning layer a new anti-forensic target, next to the classical ones of data and tools. Classical anti-forensic taxonomies do not cover it, and prompt injection defences do not anticipate it. We extend the anti-forensic model to reflect the manipulation of reasoning, and present a taxonomy of attacks carried through adversarial evidence: an attacker selects an objective, a technique, a payload location, and a concealment method. We observe a perception gap, i.e., the fact that deterministic tools, the human examiner, and the model perceive the same evidence differently, which is what lets an injection reach the model unseen by the examiner. We demonstrate three attacks against an LLM-assisted analysis pipeline, changing a reported conclusion, writing attacker-chosen content to the analyst's workstation, and causing outbound network traffic, each driven only by text planted on the seized device. Mitigations to these attacks are also proposed.