Papers for

cryptocurrency protocol designers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Security risks limit mining speed before block checks complete

Security Limits of Mining Before Validation in Nakamoto Consensus

Abstract: Mining before validation allows miners to extend a newly received block before completing its validity checks, giving them a head start in the race for the next block reward. This head start, however, comes with a security risk: rejecting one invalid block also discards the honest work built on it, an effect missed when validation is treated as instantaneous. We quantify this risk in a model of Nakamoto consensus with bounded network delay and a validation-time bound independent of processing load. We establish an explicit threshold on adversarial mining power below which honest miners' fully validated chains continue to grow and agree on a stable history with high probability over any fixed observation period. We also construct an attack that repeatedly draws honest mining onto invalid branches. When the adversary produces more than one block on average during the allowed validation time, the attack can eventually remove a target block at any fixed initial confirmation depth. Combined with ordinary private mining, this attack yields a matching asymptotic bound in the fully decentralized regime, where each honest miner has negligible mining power. The results show how validation latency limits the security of mining before validation, beyond the constraint imposed by network delay.

Thu 24 SeptCryptography and SecurityDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
The gist
Mining cryptocurrency blocks faster by starting before fully checking if the previous block is valid can save time but also introduces risks. The authors study how this early mining approach can cause problems when invalid blocks arise, leading to wasted work and instability in the blockchain. They pinpoint a limit on how much dishonest mining power can exist without breaking the system and describe attacks that exploit delayed validation. Their findings show that waiting for thorough block checks is important to maintain secure and stable mining.
Open → 2609.29222v1

Post quantum signatures need blockchain specific features for secure use

Domain Specific Post Quantum Signatures for Blockchains

Abstract: Blockchains need more than post quantum single signer signatures. They need consensus profiled authentication objects with canonical bytes, priced invalid input rejection, stable transaction identifiers, hybrid downgrade resistance, public aggregation, merge semantics, accountable signer evidence, forward secure committee rotation, and light client consequences. We argue for domain specific post quantum signatures for blockchain roles, analogously to how hash function engineering produced domain specific primitives for hash table DoS and arithmetized proof systems. We formalize transaction authorization and quorum certificate requirements, instantiate them on Bitcoin, Ethereum, and a Sei Giga style high throughput BFT stress profile, and evaluate ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, Falcon/FN-DSA, HAWK, MAYO, SNOVA, UOV/QR-UOV, FAEST, SQIsign, LaBRADOR Falcon, Squirrel, Chipmunk, and DKKW/LeanSig. The conclusion is blunt. NIST single signer signatures are necessary components, although none of the current schemes is a drop in replacement for the signature layer of modern public blockchains. The missing object is a consensus ready post quantum signature profile, not another generic size table.

Mon 21 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
Blockchain systems require special kinds of digital signatures to stay secure against future quantum computers. The authors show that just having single-user quantum-resistant signatures isn't enough. They analyze many existing signature methods and argue that blockchains need signatures tailored to their specific roles and needs, such as stable transaction tracking and verifying groups of signers. Their work points out that current post-quantum signature methods can't directly replace what blockchains use today without adapting to these unique demands.
Open → 2609.24689v1