cryptocurrency platform operators

Abstract: We consider the problem of parameter selection for EIP-1559, a widely used gas pricing mechanism for blockchains. As opposed to previous work, we aim to achieve economic security, where the chosen parameters guarantee a lower bound on total collected gas fees whenever usage over a given time window exceeds a specified threshold. This bound can be set prohibitively high, thereby economically deterring usage above a desired level. Such guarantees are particularly relevant to long-term objectives such as limiting state growth. We apply our approach to the pure exponential version of EIP-1559 which Ethereum uses and to a variant used by Robinhood Chain and Arbitrum. To achieve economic security, we first characterize the revenue-minimizing gas-usage distribution for the exponential version and for the other variant we construct a distribution whose associated fee revenue provably approximates the minimum. Using these results, we then demonstrate how to set economically secure mechanism parameters for both variants and we discuss the associated tradeoffs.

Abstract: Blockchains typically operate in open networks where it is hard to control the delay of messages. While classic blockchain protocols assumed synchrony, newer protocols try to remain secure despite unexpected network delays. Unfortunately, in the traditional model where $n$ participants can either be honest or Byzantine, we need a supermajority, or $\lfloor 2n/3\rfloor + 1$, of them to be honest. Recent work have explored the question of reducing the number of needed honest nodes in a game theory model to a majority sometimes by introducing $k$ rational players and $t$ Byzantine players. Yet, to our knowledge, no blockchain protocol managed to reduce it further. In this paper, we offer a blockchain protocol called Secure and Tolerant Algorithm through ($k,t$)-robust Equilibrium (STAKE) that works with only $\lfloor n/3\rfloor + 1$ honest players. STAKE requires each consensus participant to stake a sufficiently large amount $s$ compared to their liquidity $\ell$. We show that the probability that a coalition manages to execute $ζ$ double spending attacks (we call them a $ζ$-uple attack) drops polynomially fast with $ζ$. This allows us to demonstrate that STAKE reaches a ($k,t$)-robust equilibrium, or that rational players do not collude with Byzantine, even with a relatively low $s/\ell$ ratio.

Abstract: Asset names are associated with investor trading and asset prices, but where names and issuer quality are formed jointly, information, preference and attention-coordination explanations are difficult to distinguish. We study a token launchpad on which tokens issued under the default template use the same contract code, have a fixed supply and carry no cash flows, while names can be registered at almost no cost, cannot be verified and may be reused. Using all 458,174 default-template tokens launched from February to June 2026 and a sample split by creator entity fixed in advance, we find that the share of tokens attracting an outside buyer rises from 34.9% to 52.8% across name-appeal deciles, but within creator and creation minute the effect of appeal is small and does not replicate in the validation sample. Conditional on early capital inflow and creator fixed effects, the residual effects of names on migration, peak market capitalization and post-peak drawdown are statistically equivalent to zero, and buyers who follow appealing names earn no economically meaningful premium. The same name attracts less capital with each reuse, names whose first token draws more capital are copied sooner, and competition over names mainly transfers wealth among buyers.