Papers for

cryptocurrency exchange operators

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Ethereum randomness manipulation grows with complex rewards

RANDAO Manipulation in the Presence of MEV

Abstract: Ethereum's randomness beacon (RANDAO) is well-known to be manipulable, and prior work [AW24] computes the precise fraction of blocks a strategic proposer can propose. The fraction of blocks proposed, however, is only a proxy for participants' rewards. We propose a generalized reward model capturing many canonical forms of rewards: consensus reward rollover, multi-block MEV, CEX-DEX arbitrage, oracle manipulation, and others. We provide a methodology that computes an ε-optimal strategy for any reward scheme in our model (and in particular, any combination of the above rewards). Finally, we apply our methodology to several canonical examples, and establish the sensitivity of RANDAO manipulation to the underlying rewards. We find that if rewards partially roll over, or scale super-linearly with consecutive blocks, the incentive to manipulate RANDAO is amplified. Lastly, we investigate tail-slot slashing, which can be modeled as a reward function, and show that honest equilibria can be recovered.

Thu 1 OctComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Ethereum uses a system called RANDAO to create random numbers, but this system can be influenced or manipulated by participants. Previous work measured how often manipulators can control blocks, but not their actual rewards. The paper introduces a new way to calculate rewards from different sources like transaction fees and arbitrage opportunities. They show that if rewards depend on multiple blocks or increase faster than linearly, manipulation becomes more profitable. They also explore a penalty mechanism that can encourage honest behavior.
Open → 2610.02143v1

Private mempool hiding needs strong lower bound to block sandwich attacks

How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks

Abstract: Private and encrypted mempools hide pending transactions to stop sandwich attacks and other forms of maximal extractable value (MEV), but what they hide is rarely everything: a transaction's pair, direction, and a coarse range for its size can still leak. How much leakage makes sandwiching pay? We answer exactly for a fee-free constant-product automated market maker, the pricing rule behind Uniswap v2. Traders observe an interval containing the victim's size and bid in a first-price auction for the right to sandwich it, and the winning front-run must keep the victim's trade executable at every size in the interval. The answer turns on the smallest size consistent with the leak. It alone determines the feasible front-runs, the largest feasible front-run is optimal for pointwise, expected, and worst-case profit alike, and the guaranteed profit has a closed form. When execution is costly, a privacy layer that wants to rule out sandwiches profitable at every consistent size may therefore reveal anything about the size except a lower bound above an explicit threshold; the upper end of the range is irrelevant. With two or more symmetric traders, every pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the auction hands the entire expected net rent to the auctioneer. If the direction is hidden too, no non-contingent first leg front-runs both possible directions, while post-trade arbitrage can survive even perfect pre-trade hiding.

Fri 25 SeptComputer Science and Game TheoryCryptography and Security
The gist
Sandwich attacks happen when traders see a pending transaction and try to insert their own trades around it to make a profit. The authors study how much information about a transaction size must be hidden in private mempools to stop these attacks. They find that the smallest possible size visible to others determines if attackers can profit by front-running. If the privacy leaks a lower bound above a certain threshold, then profitable sandwich attacks can no longer occur. They also show that hiding the direction of the trade makes some attacks harder but not impossible.
Open → 2609.31379v1