Papers for

committee software developers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Proportional election rule works under complex voting constraints

Proportionality in Elections under Feasibility Constraints and Ranked Ballots: The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule

Abstract: We study elections with ranked ballots and general feasibility constraints, which indicate which sets of candidates are allowed as outcomes. We introduce the first proportionality axiom for this general setting and show that it extends the established notions from specific models that fit our general framework. We extend the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule to general constraints and prove that it satisfies our axiom exactly for matroid constraints. Although the naive implementation of SCR involves a step that is computationally intractable for weak orders, we show that in practical cases it can be implemented in polynomial time or efficiently in FPT time. We also illustrate limitations of this rule for approval ballots and provide its first empirical evaluation.

Fri 6 NovComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Choosing a fair group of winners in elections can get tricky when there are special rules about which sets of candidates can win. The authors introduce a new fairness rule that works for many kinds of these rules and voting with ranked choices. They show this fairness fits well with known ideas and prove it works perfectly for certain mathematical cases called matroids. While the basic way to use their rule can be slow, they find practical shortcuts that make it efficient in many real situations. They also tested the rule in practice and discuss its limits when voters just approve multiple candidates instead of ranking them.
Open → 2611.10229v1