Papers for
cloud platform operators
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Opportunistic garbage collection lowers heap size using idle CPU cores
Opportunistic ZGC: Leveraging Idle Cores for More Effective Concurrent Garbage Collection
Abstract: Managed language runtimes often provide concurrent garbage collectors so that latency-critical applications with large working sets can keep running while most collection work proceeds in the background. ZGC is a production-quality, generational, concurrent collector in OpenJDK with sub-millisecond pause times. While ZGC is designed to run concurrently, frequent and excessive collections with ZGC can still slow the mutators due to synchronization costs and interference with shared computing resources. Hence, the ZGC scheduler is conservative by default, and in most cases, will grow the heap toward the maximum allowed before scheduling a collection. While this approach minimizes collection effort, it can be wasteful, or even harmful, if the maximum heap size is not well tuned to the actual working set. We propose Opportunistic ZGC (OppZGC), a feedback-directed ZGC scheduling policy that constrains the heap dynamically and automatically, without per-application tuning. OppZGC identifies periods when CPU cores are underutilized and leverages them for concurrent collection with ZGC. We describe the design and implementation of OppZGC in OpenJDK's HotSpot Java VM and evaluate it with standard and latency-sensitive benchmarks from DaCapo Chopin and SPECjbb. OppZGC limits heap usage when there is CPU capacity sufficient for additional collections, and avoids scheduling extra collections when they would substantially degrade performance. Overall, it reduces maximum heap usage for our DaCapo benchmarks by between 61% and 90%, on average, depending on configuration, with minimal impact on throughput and request latency compared to default ZGC.
Deceptive worker profiles disrupt multi-agent task planning efficiency
Misleading the Planner through Deceptive Resumes: Registration-Time Injection in Centralized Multi-Agent Systems
Abstract: A centralized LLM-based multi-agent system (MAS) extends its functionality by registering new worker agents, whose descriptions are read by the planner to decide how a task is decomposed, which worker executes each subtask, and what each subtask requires. Third-party descriptions are authored outside the system but trusted by the planner, creating a registration-time injection channel. The payload is planted before any user instruction arrives, targets the planner and propagates through the generated plan to benign workers, taking effect even when the crafted worker is never assigned a subtask or invoked. We define four worker-description fields: functionality, input specification, output specification, and usage constraints. Among 32,000 descriptions from three public agent marketplaces, most omit input specifications and usage constraints, while at least 23.35% contain content outside these fields. We construct eight description-manipulation attack strategies targeting task decomposition, capability grounding, and subtask specification, and evaluate them on GAIA. In the most severe cases, a single manipulated description reduces task success from 84.31% to 37.25%, or increases token consumption or execution time by over 111%, while the user objective remains unchanged and workers faithfully execute the resulting plan. These effects persist across two MAS implementations, six planner LLMs, four LLM evaluators, and the real-world descriptions from three marketplaces. We further propose DescGuard, a registration-time defense that retains only worker-scoped interface information before descriptions reach the planner. DescGuard restores the targeted planning metrics and downstream performance toward their baseline levels without modifying worker implementations, the planner, or the orchestration logic, and composes with existing isolation, permission-control, and runtime mechanisms.
Biometric access controls improve shared memory use in multi-user AI agents
BIO-MEMART: Biometric-Aware KV Cache Memory for Multi-User LLM Agents
Abstract: KV cache is evolving from a serving optimization into an external memory substrate for long-term LLM agents. In a shared multi-user deployment, however, reusable KV blocks introduce a missing access-control question: semantic relevance alone cannot determine whether a memory block is authorized for the current physical user. We propose Bio-MemArt, a biometric-aware KV-cache memory framework for multi-user LLM agents. Bio-MemArt attaches a normalized biometric template to each stored KV memory block, filters the shared memory pool with the current user's biometric probe, and then runs the original MemArt retrieval and KV reuse pipeline only inside the authorized candidate pool. This design preserves latent-space retrieval, direct cache reuse, and decoupled position encoding while adding physical-user access control to shared KV memory. We evaluate Bio-MemArt under Owner and Non-owner query conditions on long-term dialogue QA with face and palmprint benchmarks. Across face benchmarks, the average owner and non-owner biometric success rates are 95.71% and 0.86%; across palmprint benchmarks, they are 97.60% and 2.00%. In the efficiency study, average prefill tokens drop from 18,781.96 under full-context prompting to 28.57 with Bio-MemArt, showing that biometric gating preserves the low-token operating regime of KV-cache memory.
MOLE benchmark detects hidden insider threats in AI agent accounts
MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agents
Abstract: Model misalignment, prompt injection, or operator misuse could lead AI agents operating frontier-lab accounts to exfiltrate model weights, poison training data, or weaken release gates. Existing benchmarks do not test whether defenders can detect this activity among routine work under a limited review budget. We introduce MOLE, an open benchmark of 150 AI-operated accounts sharing 9 stateful services over 30 workdays, with 12 threats and 8 corpora from four models totaling roughly 20 billion tokens. Of 39 agent models, 72% complete most assigned harmful objectives and agent refusal does not predict completion. MOLE enables comparison of 40 monitors across corpus generators, observability levels, and threats; even the best evaluated monitor in our single-day audit-event comparison misses nearly half of completed harm. MOLE also enables monitor development: benchmark-guided search improves a mid-tier monitor by 49-64%, while selective use of a stronger monitor improves budget-AUC by 10% over applying it to every account-day at comparable modeled cost.