Papers for
browser extension developers
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Native messaging enables dangerous cross boundary browser attacks
The Native Menace: Host-to-Browser Cross-Boundary Attacks via Native Messaging
Abstract: Modern browsers are complex software platforms that users can customize through browser extensions to further expand their functionality. Extensions derive their functionality from privileged browser APIs that expose powerful capabilities. Prior work has extensively studied how malicious webpages or extensions can target those capabilities. However, prior research has overlooked the NativeMessaging API, which allows extensions to create a communication channel that bridges the gap between web content rendered in the browser and native apps running on the user's machine. This API enables workflows that cross the browser's boundary to perform critical operations (e.g., digital signing) or exchange sensitive data (e.g., credentials). In this paper, we conduct the first, to our knowledge, empirical security analysis of NativeMessaging, and present a novel attack that allows a non-privileged malicious native app to misuse browsers' native messaging capabilities to stealthily intercept sensitive communications or launch confused deputy attacks against other native apps. To demonstrate the significant risk introduced by native messaging, we present a series of concrete attacks against popular and critical apps (e.g., 1Password, the European Union's eID system, Google Drive), whose browser extensions have more than 532 million cumulative downloads. Our attacks have severe ramifications, including full password vault leakage, and arbitrary document signing in governmental workflows. Fundamentally, these attacks are possible due to native messaging being built on top of an untrusted communication channel without providing a root of trust or enforcing some form of client attestation. Accordingly, we propose a straightforward mitigation technique of message encryption with out-of-band secret sharing, to prevent our attacks.
Browser agents approve unauthorized access via injected page text
The Agent Clicks Approve: Injected Page Text Makes Browser Agents Authorize Access the Task Never Named
Abstract: A browser agent that works in its user's signed-in session can be steered by a two-sentence note on a page it reads into approving a third party's access to the user's account. The agent is a confused deputy: the session supplies the authority, the page designates the access request to approve or the webhook URL to register, and nothing at the point of action checks one against the other. The agent thereby supplies the approval click that a consent screen reserves for the account holder. We measure this failure on two authorization surfaces, an OAuth-style access grant and a webhook registration, with agents built on an open-source browser framework and models from two providers. Without a defense the unauthorized action completed in all 73 attack runs. An instruction telling the model that only the user's task authorizes a grant still left 7 of 10 consent attacks completing. We therefore move the check to where the action completes. The authority envelope gate has the service accept a request only when it matches the task's envelope, the client and account or the webhook URL that the user's task named, fixed before the agent starts. With the gate the agent still sent the request in every one of 70 attack runs, the service rejected each, and the action completed in every control run whose task named it. A service that receives the task's envelope should therefore check agent-driven authorization requests against it.
Gmail extension detects Nigerian fintech phishing with sender checks and AI
A Gmail-Based Phishing Detection Prototype for Nigerian Fintech Emails Using Sender Checks and BiLSTM Classification
Abstract: Phishing emails that impersonate Nigerian fintech providers can combine deceptive sender addresses, lookalike links, and locally familiar language. This study presents a Gmail browser extension that integrates sender-domain and URL checks with a bidirectional long short-term memory (BiLSTM) classifier. The extension compares visible sender addresses and links with profiles for eight fintech platforms, obtains a phishing probability from a locally hosted Flask service, and displays a legitimate, warning, or phishing verdict when an email is opened. The BiLSTM classifier was evaluated on 8,943 test messages from a cleaned dataset of 59,622 phishing and legitimate emails. The test confusion matrix recorded 4,308 true negatives, no false positives, one false negative, and 4,634 true positives. These counts correspond to 99.99% accuracy, 100.00% precision, 99.98% recall, and 99.99% F1 score. Tokenized sequence analysis identified 5.79% overlap between the training and test sets, which may inflate performance estimates for independent messages. A Gmail demonstration showed the integrated extension producing user-visible verdicts, although the complete system was not evaluated on a labeled test set. The findings establish the feasibility of the implemented prototype while leaving its end-to-end detection performance and generalization to unseen attacks open for further evaluation.