Papers for

blockchain protocol developers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Ethereum improves transaction fees with multiple resource prices

More Meters or More Prices? One- vs. Multi-dimensional Fee Mechanisms on Ethereum

Abstract: Permissionless blockchains use transaction fee mechanisms to allocate the resources that transactions consume, such as execution, data bandwidth, and state creation. Recent blockchain designs explore pricing these resources separately rather than through a single unit. We study this shift on Ethereum, whose roadmap moves in stages from a one-dimensional fee mechanism to a multi-dimensional one. We build a demand model for the three resources, calibrated from Ethereum's 2025 block-capacity increases, and find that state creation is the most price-responsive. We then evaluate both mechanisms at higher block capacity, combining the model with transaction-level metering reconstruction and block-level simulation. Under a one-dimensional mechanism, state creation determines the fee and suppresses execution throughput. Adjusting how state is metered can align resource usage under constant demand, but a single fee cannot track all resources when demand varies, leaving all underutilized. A multi-dimensional mechanism removes this fee coupling, but execution still generates data that must be propagated. Across different allocations between block execution and propagation time, the multi-dimensional mechanism delivers 4--34\% more execution throughput at similarly low congestion, with higher target utilization and state growth near its intended level.

Sat 24 OctComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Blockchain platforms like Ethereum need to decide how much users should pay to use computing power and store data. This study looks at the difference between charging one fee for everything versus charging separately for different resources like execution steps, data size, and new accounts created. The authors found that charging separate fees lets Ethereum handle more transactions efficiently, especially when demand changes. This new approach can better balance different demands and keep the system running smoothly.
Open → 2610.33455v1

PropAMMs earn trading edge by active price updates across blockchains

Active Liquidity On Chain: Evidence from PropAMMs Across Chains

Abstract: The liquidity providers of most typical automated market makers (AMMs) are passive and known to suffer from adverse selection. AMMs traditionally rely on trades executed on them to sync the price with external markets (and a notion of fair value thereof). As a result, when an external fair value moves, arbitrageurs trade on AMMs to pick off their stale quotes. A recent approach termed proprietary automated market makers (propAMMs) emerged as a response in 2024: these on-chain programs instead have their singular operator quote from its own inventory, repricing without a trade via efficiently provided price updates. By 2026, propAMMs accounted for more than half of SOL/USDC volume on Solana. We present the first year-long longitudinal measurement of propAMMs on Solana, Base and Monad, and decode the on-chain logic of the dominant propAMM on Base. We find that two seconds after a fill, propAMMs earn 0.37 bps on Solana and 1.19 bps on Base, while AMMs lose 0.22 and 0.62 bps. We empirically quantify and classify their edge as stemming from four factors: propAMMs continuously reprice rather than waiting for a trade, they charge for the source-dependent risk each counterparty might bring, they avoid cross-venue arbitrage from other on-chain markets (such as other AMMs), and they spoof by filling trades at a worse price than they quote. Finally, we show that on our proxy for retail flow (i.e., fills that arrive when the reference price is not moving) propAMMs collect 0.26 bps on Solana where AMMs collect 2.59 bps, indicating that they offer better prices for short-term uninformed flow.

Tue 29 SeptComputational Engineering, Finance, and Science
The gist
Most automated trading systems passively wait for trades to update prices, which can lead to losses when market prices change quickly. The authors studied proprietary automated market makers (propAMMs) that actively update their prices on several blockchains without waiting for trades. These active updates give propAMMs a small but consistent profit advantage compared to traditional systems. The study also shows that propAMMs offer better prices to casual traders who do not move the market, improving trading conditions for typical users.
Open → 2609.38056v1

Recursive invariants improve staged transaction workflows in UTXO blockchains

Staged Multi-step UTXO Workflows via Recursive Invariants

Abstract: Stateless UTXO-style execution validates transactions using local and referenced data, enabling parallel validation and predictable serialized-size/weight accounting. Multi-step workflows thread state across outputs, and a prepared next-step transaction may become stale if another valid spend confirms first. Explicit state threading therefore shifts consistency maintenance, off-chain tracking, and transaction rebuilding to the protocol boundary, increasing coordination cost and latency. Recursive invariants (RIs), our proposed transaction-level logic and toolchain, address this gap by expressing workflow rules as transaction-level predicates over a transaction's inputs and indexed successor positions referenced by the RI. An accepted transaction realizing such a successor position re-checks the predecessor's RI one step later, carrying the workflow rule forward without shared mutable application state or executable output logic. Thus, multi-step protocol rules preserve validation-time locality and admit explicit cost accounting, while cross-transaction guarantees arise from repeated one-step checking. Not all successor clauses are checkable at validation time, so our small statically typed domain-specific language (DSL) uses three-valued semantics (true, false, unknown) to defer future-dependent obligations until checkable. Co-designed with this DSL, our framework formalizes UTXO validation and ledger extension, identifies the validation-time-evaluable one-step fragment, and proves the deduction system sound w.r.t. the three-valued semantics. We give validation and ledger-extension algorithms for this model. We implement a prototype RI interpreter and benchmarking toolchain for six workloads. Six practice-motivated case studies exhibit roughly linear cumulative validation-cost proxy growth and illustrate staged workflow constraints without preconstructing each successor.

Tue 22 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
Transactions in some blockchain systems rely on outputs becoming inputs for future steps, which can cause problems if multiple people try to spend the same outputs at once. This paper presents a new way to write rules that check these multi-step transactions step-by-step without needing complex off-chain coordination. Their method uses a small programming language that allows some checks to be deferred until the information is available, keeping transaction validation local and efficient. The authors built tools to test their idea and showed it works well for several common scenarios.
Open → 2609.26305v1

Blockchain defense cuts 51 percent attacks with early warnings and checkpoints

Mitigating 51% Attacks in Blockchain Systems Through Early Detection and Checkpoint-Based Defense

Abstract: The 51% attack remains one of the significant security concern in Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains, where increasing hash-power concentration can create a malicious majority-control risk and enable adversarial chain reorganization. This paper proposes a two-layer defense that combines early hash-power monitoring with checkpoint-based mitigation. The first layer monitors mining-power concentration and provides an early warning before the critical majority-control threshold is reached. The second layer uses checkpointing to restrict the depth of accepted chain reorganizations. Monte Carlo simulations are used to evaluate both mechanisms under different attack scenarios. Across 1,000 simulation runs, a 45% warning threshold provided a mean warning-to-critical lead time of 10.531 minutes before the modeled 50% critical threshold was reached. At the selected checkpoint depth of N = 6, approximately 63.68% of simulated reorganization attempts were rejected, while the mean reorganization-depth outcome decreased from 7.948 to 1.634 blocks, representing an approximately 79.4% reduction. The results demonstrate that early detection and checkpoint-based mitigation provide complementary mechanisms for reducing the potential impact of 51% attacks under the evaluated conditions.

Sun 13 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
A problem in some blockchains is that if one attacker controls more than half of the computers mining new blocks, they can rewrite the transaction history unfairly. The authors suggest two defenses: first, watch the mining power closely to warn before an attacker gains majority control; second, fix 'checkpoints' in the chain that make big changes harder. They tested these ideas with computer simulations and found that warnings came about 10 minutes before a dangerous takeover, and checkpoints blocked or limited many attacks. Together, these tools can make blockchains safer against majority attacks.
Open → 2609.14670v1