behavioral economists

Abstract: Many of the questions now put to large language models have no correct answer to score against: what a policy is worth, which option a user should choose, how to weigh competing values. Stated-preference economics has faced this problem for decades. It judges survey responses without knowing the true value, through a framework of validity and related concepts: content, construct, and criterion validity, reliability, incentive compatibility, and consequentiality. We argue that this framework is a general method for evaluating language models, and we set out what each concept means for LLM evaluation. We demonstrate the approach using a published water-quality stated preference economic valuation survey (Vossler et al. 2023) administered to six models. In this economic application, the validity tests take the form of predictions from economic theory: demand should slope down, and willingness to pay should respond to the scope of the good and to income. The tests separate the models sharply. Two older models fail the most basic test at a household income level of \$75,000, and the two newest pass every test of theoretical validity we can score, but diverge on convergent validity. Passing validity tests shows that a model's answers are coherent, not that they are correct.

Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as synthetic personas representing survey respondents. Their validity as substitutes for particular respondents depends on whether they reproduce individuals' decisions. We examine what information helps synthetic respondents predict each individual's later choices, using five conditions that add progressively richer information: no personal information, demographics, personality traits, cognitive scores, and finally the respondent's earlier survey choices as behavioral history. We use a two-wave panel of 845 US adults who completed measures of 14 behavioral biases (spanning risk, time preferences, overconfidence, and reasoning), so each respondent's earlier answers provide a human test-retest benchmark; in the behavioral-history condition, all items that score the target bias are withheld. At the population level, the average number of biases per respondent in every condition is close to the human average (7.1-8.1 biases, against 7.1 for humans). This aggregate similarity masks differences in variance: persona descriptions recover only 53-67% of human between-person variation, whereas adding behavioral history restores it to approximately the human level. At the individual level, description-based personas achieve only 7-12% of the informedness observed in human test-retest responses, while adding behavioral history raises this to 28%. The condition including behavioral history has the highest estimated informedness in all 17 demographic groups, whereas description-based conditions provide little or no information for some groups. Synthetic responses also exhibit stronger education- and income-related differences than human responses. For LLM synthetic personas, a respondent's past answers add more to individual-level prediction than a description of who they are.

Abstract: We study the computational complexity of peak-oriented rationalizability, a survey based revealed-preference test introduced by Seror (2026). We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for testing rationalizability and recovering a utility function, establishing that peak-oriented preference elicitation is computationally tractable. In contrast, we show that computing the peak-oriented Houtman-Maks index is NP-hard. These results delineate the precise computational boundaries of peak-oriented revealed-preference analysis.

Abstract: The idea that emotions in biological systems are analogous to intrinsic colored noise is advanced and justified. A model describing the dynamics of operation of biological networks under the influence of colored noise is suggested. The agents of a biological network can be represented either by biological species, such as humans and animals, or by neurons of the brain, or by the nodes of a neural network. Operational actions, or decisions, in a biological noisy network are based not only on the evaluation of utility of alternatives, but also on the agents emotions. The model is probabilistic, with the choice of alternatives characterized by the related probabilities. At the initial step, the agents make decisions individually and then start exchanging information with each other and imitating the actions of other agents, thus forming a biological network of interacting agents. Numerical simulations are accomplished for a heterogeneous society consisting of three groups of agents, one group possessing long-range memory, the other group, short-range memory, and the third group of super-rational agents acting strictly on the basis of utility, being deprived of emotions. Dynamics of opinions in different groups can be smooth, oscillatory, or chaotic. Altogether, eight types of operation are found, depending on the dynamics of group decisions. Under strong imitation effect, there appears chaotic motion in the evolution of decision choice. It is shown how the Ellsberg paradox can be resolved and how the exchange of information influences the dynamics of this paradox.

Abstract: Large language models act as strategic agents and models of human choice, yet choosing like a strategic agent does not mean computing like one. We recorded activations from four open-weight models --- dense and mixture-of-experts, including a matched base--instruct pair --- in one-shot play of 144 strict ordinal $2\times2$ games. We followed a prespecified incentive from prompt, through activations, to choice. Dense models mirrored the unadjusted human decline with game complexity. Incentive and choice were detectable in every model, but models differed in whether incentive reached the choice, aligned with it and, where tested, whether strengthening it shifted preference. The base and instruction-tuned Qwen2.5 models chose almost identically at baseline yet differed in whether incentive reached choice. Fixed decision cues were distinguishable internally but changed choices selectively. Similar behaviour can rest on different computation; post-training can reshape the path from represented incentive to decision while leaving behaviour and decodable information largely intact.