automotive software engineers

Abstract: Autonomous driving requires more than recognizing what is present in a scene: a planner must determine how road structure, surrounding agents, and their motion states should influence a future maneuver. Existing learning-based planners can capture these influences through latent scene features and trajectory decoders, but the relationship between environmental factors and candidate actions often remains implicit. This limits the ability to inspect, diagnose, or refine how scene context affects the safety of a predicted trajectory. Classical safety fields provide an explicit spatial representation of this relationship, but their risk shapes and relative weights are prescribed in advance and do not adapt to each scene. We introduce READ, a framework that learns an explicit, planning-aligned risk representation from complementary geometric and behavioral constraints. READ instantiates this representation as a continuous spatiotemporal field, enabling differentiable queries along candidate trajectories. The learned field connects scene understanding with action selection by encouraging predicted trajectories to align with low-risk regions, while retaining a differentiable interface for trajectory evaluation and refinement. READ integrates with both end-to-end planners and Vision-Language-Action models. Experiments on NAVSIM show consistent gains across matched end-to-end backbones and strong performance in a VLA setting; READ also achieves competitive results on NAVSIM v2. These results establish learned spatial risk as an explicit, adaptable representation for safe planning.

Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are commonly represented through multiple interconnected models. During development, CPS consistency requires that shared model elements remain compatible across these models. Uncertainty, for example, due to sensor noise or model abstraction, changes the admissible values of model elements and can introduce inconsistencies, i.e., situations in which models can no longer be jointly satisfied. While existing approaches can determine consistency for a given uncertainty configuration, they provide limited support for systematically exploring, analyzing, and explaining inconsistency across large uncertainty spaces. We address this challenge by reformulating inconsistency as an intervention response modeling problem. Using Saltelli sampling and multi-fidelity Monte Carlo estimation, we generate intervention-response datasets and train a surrogate model that directly predicts inconsistency from the propagated uncertainty geometry. Experiments on 48 scenarios and 10 CPS domains show that the surrogate matches Monte Carlo estimates while reducing evaluation time from milliseconds to microseconds, enabling orders-of-magnitude more response-surface evaluations within fixed computational budgets. Building on the learned response surfaces, we perform sensitivity analysis to identify dominant uncertainty drivers and introduce a gradient-based consistency recourse method to determine minimal uncertainty interventions that restore consistency. The results show that inconsistency under uncertainty can be effectively learned, analyzed, and repaired through response-surface modeling, providing a scalable foundation for uncertainty-aware consistency management in CPS development.

Abstract: Automated vehicles rely on millions of lines of safety-critical software, yet general-purpose analyzers do not understand which code can affect vehicle motion. This study asks whether large language models (LLMs) with explicit automated-vehicle (AV) security knowledge improve weakness detection beyond rule-based tools. We developed an AV vulnerability taxonomy with 18 weakness classes from vulnerability records, security advisories, and AV-security literature, and integrated it into LLM-based Security Analysis for Automated Vehicles (LLMSec-AV). Evaluated on Autoware, the framework decomposed 770 translation units into 4,673 functions and analyzed 161 functions under four prompting conditions involving taxonomy context, retrieval from 374 prior disclosures, and multi-step analysis. Findings were compared with 46 weakness locations mined from upstream fixes and a flag-volume-matched permutation baseline. CodeQL, Semgrep, cppcheck, and the Clang Static Analyzer evaluated the same code, with AV-specific rules added to CodeQL and Semgrep. Generated fuzzing harnesses were tested using AFL++ and sanitizers. LLM conditions recovered up to 76% of the 46 known weakness locations, outperforming conventional analyzers. CodeQL, Semgrep, and the Clang Static Analyzer matched none, while cppcheck matched one despite 1,301 alerts. Unaided prompting achieved similar detection performance, showing that the taxonomy did not drive recall. However, taxonomy context increased the share of findings assigned to a weakness class from near zero to over 80%, improving interpretability and triage. Six of the 18 classes could not be directly represented as static-analysis rules. LLMSec-AV introduces an AV-specific, machine-readable vulnerability taxonomy for weakness discovery and shows that LLMs can complement conventional analyzers by identifying and organizing safety-relevant findings in real AV software.