automated pricing teams

Abstract: When pricing agents meet repeatedly on a platform, the platform decides who faces whom. We ask whether that choice moves the prices the agents learn, and whether a rise comes with learned punishment. In a pre-registered randomised experiment in the Bertrand duopoly of Calvano et al., each agent's price is set by a tabular Q-learning module, not by the small language model attached to it, and we randomise whether each agent keeps its partner, sees its rival's prices and can send messages. Keeping the same partner raises the level of profits, averaged over training, by 0.27 of the gap between competitive and monopoly profit (95% CI 0.20 to 0.35, all twenty paired runs positive), our registered primary result, and the resting price by 0.17 of the Nash-to-monopoly range (post hoc). A plain tabular learner reproduces the effect in all 25 further blocks, and there one permanent partner raises the level more than about three do (+0.23 against +0.05, exploratory). Where rival prices are hidden, the price-setting module cannot see a cut, so cannot punish it, yet the resting price rises as much and the rise lasts to the end of training, while with visible rivals it shrinks with longer training (post hoc). Where the rival is visible, a static best responder accounts for a third to a half of what a forced-deviation probe reads as punishment, on the starts where the rival can see the cut, and net of it the registered test of learned punishment is inconclusive. A test that looks only for punishment would thus miss the rise where the rival is hidden, while a check for profitable deviations flags most of those prices (post hoc). In an exploratory extension, untrained Qwen2.5 7B and 14B models under one prompt show the effect when the rival's price is left out of the prompt and inconsistently when it is shown, the 7B result replicating on fresh blocks, while two other model families show none.

Abstract: Runtime traces can appear transparent, but a closed-loop policy determines which states are visited and which failures become visible. We study a simulated hotel-pricing agent mapping time, inventory, and market state to discrete price actions under varying demand regimes. A fault may leave no aggregate trace when the policy rarely visits affected cells. We treat entry into aggregate-only fault interpretation as a diagnosability decision preceding scoring or localization. A reference-map gate requires repeated clean-policy support; a matched runtime gate then requires joint support in clean and current streams. Signal analysis occurs only after both pass. We calibrate false admission on a disjoint clean stream at the physical-component level and model detection by affected clean traffic rather than nominal cell coverage. In a frozen one-shot heldout, 55/72 (76.4%) regime-component units were reference-admitted, representing 20 physical components; 54/55 passed matched runtime admission, while the rejected unit abstained. Stable false admission was 0/20, with a one-sided exact 95% upper bound of 0.1391, meeting the frozen 0.20 criterion. Across 540 repeated unit-arm rows nested in those 20 clusters, affected clean traffic reduced negative log likelihood by 29.3% relative to cell coverage, a gain of 0.1264 nats per row (cluster-bootstrap 95% interval [0.0593, 0.1918]). Adding mask family and its interaction improved log loss by 0.0015 nats per row (one-sided upper bound 0.0066), below the frozen 0.01 practical-sufficiency margin. A development audit found that exact minimum hitting set and greedy selection chose identical supports in 12/12 scenarios because singleton evidence had resolved the conflicts. The result is a bounded rule for interpreting aggregate agent behavior: first establish exposure, then score change, and abstain when the trace cannot support the claim.