ai system designers

Abstract: How does a language model's dependence on query-routing information and target knowledge change as it answers a question? We study this question through layerwise interventions on the hidden state at the end of the question. Across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma, we compare country-continent questions with noun, adjective, and code answers while keeping several fitted measurements distinct. A pair-conditioned request direction describes which country is queried in natural single-country questions; a global request direction describes first- versus second-country requests in paired questions; separate selection candidates test control among contents already available in the hidden state. A diagnostic reanalysis of frozen Qwen natural-question states shows that the pair-conditioned direction grows stronger before interventions on it begin to alter later fitted knowledge, with this causal window opening while answer-supporting content is still forming. The paired three-model trajectories are not uniform: Gemma shows a partially overlapping mid-layer routing-content profile, whereas Llama has no sustained routing-effect window under the same gates. In the paired protocol, dependence on the global request direction decreases from fixed earlier to later layer sets while dependence on fitted content persists. A matched Qwen comparison shows that the pair-conditioned direction retains a late effect, so this operational handoff concerns the global fitted direction rather than all request information. These results separate early readability, natural strength, causal steering, and later content dependence.

Abstract: We show that ordinary business language --- "maximize profitability" --- induces profit-oriented ambiguity resolution: LLMs systematically dismiss ambiguous signals of potential safety violations to serve business objectives. In 3,600 controlled trials across eight reasoning-capable LLMs, adding a profit mandate to otherwise identical prompts increases risk-dismissing judgments by 6.8 percentage points (p < 0.0001), suppresses board escalation recommendations by 13.9pp (p < 0.0001), and shifts severity assessments downward (p < 0.0001). The mandate never instructs models to downplay risks; instead, chain-of-thought traces reveal motivated reasoning: models acknowledge concerns, then invoke profit logic to justify dismissing them. We characterize these findings as the Profit Alignment Problem: when AI systems are given ordinary business objectives, they develop systematic strategies for suppressing inconvenient information that no designer intended or specified.

Abstract: AI agents sometimes act aligned when they infer they are being tested, and differently when not. We argue this is not an anomaly but what current training regimes are structured to select for. Reinforcement-learning-based alignment folds norms and task pursuit into one policy: the system learns its norms from scored behavior, and scoring flattens them. Do not do X is learned as doing X costs something if noticed. On every datum training can produce, a policy that complies only when it might be observed is indistinguishable from one that complies always. The experiment that would tell them apart - scoring unobserved behavior - is a contradiction in terms. Conditional compliance is thus the most that behavioral training can be known to deliver. Agency sharpens the problem: agents operate mostly where no one is watching, and can act on whether they are watched. An iterated pipeline that trains against detected failures selects for passing detection, not for complying. This account unifies alignment faking, sandbagging, and evaluation-aware scheming. And it reorients the remedy: not deeper internalization but architecture, making violations unavailable rather than unchosen.

Abstract: Human-AI interaction can improve current performance while changing the capabilities and relationships on which future performance depends. We develop adaptive complementarity, a framework for choosing interaction architecture with these state consequences in view. Access, information exposure, task allocation, timing, and communication can alter which arrangement will be valuable later; their settings can often be reset faster than the capabilities, search patterns, or conventions they create. Three mechanisms organize the argument: information exposure and collective search, delegation and capability evolution, and strategic interdependence and information governance. Their integration yields cross-mechanism implications, including conditions under which a loss of expertise heterogeneity increases the information differentiation required to preserve independent search. We distinguish strong human-AI complementarity from advantage over another workflow and from advantage over an evolving reference policy. A knowledge-coverage illustration shows how different interaction histories can reverse current workflow rankings even at equal human competence. It also separates that result from the incremental value of state feedback, which can be small when a well-chosen stable workflow anticipates learning. The framework directs evaluation toward the states present interaction creates, their consequences for later architectural fit, and the conditions under which observing and responding to them is worthwhile.