ai game developers

Abstract: Domain terminology provides concise descriptions of game states and strategic relationships, but whether game-playing language models can accurately recognize these concepts and relate them to move evaluation remains unclear. We construct a controlled evaluation set centered on atari and its relationship to sente in Go, examining terminology recognition under local board changes and move evaluation under different strategic conditions. We conduct our tests on LoGos, a Go language model, after fine-tuning it with terminology and commentary supervision. The model struggles to recognize changes in the atari relationship and assess its strategic implications. Its terminology predictions are associated with move preferences even when those preferences contradict the reference evaluation. Our controlled tests provide a framework for examining whether language-based Go agents connect domain terminology with precise board relationships and strategic move values.

Abstract: Computing equilibria in high-dimensional continuous games requires learning and representing rich, multi-modal strategy distributions, something conventional neural policies struggle to achieve. Diffusion models offer a natural solution, but standard diffusion training requires direct samples from a fixed target distribution, which are generally unavailable under iterative game-solving updates. We propose a diffusion-based framework for equilibrium computation that enables diffusion-based variants of Online Mirror Descent (OMD) and Fictitious Play (FP). Our approach derives a reweighted score-matching objective that trains diffusion policies without requiring direct samples from each updated policy. Our main method, DiffNash, combines the fast convergence of OMD with the sample efficiency of FP by reusing past actions through a replay buffer. To correct the resulting distribution shift from sample reuse, we derive an unbiased estimator of the difference between current and past policies' Evidence Lower Bounds, whose exponential provides a tractable proxy for the corresponding importance weight without evaluating diffusion likelihoods. We evaluate our approach on forest protection games and continuous Colonel Blotto games, reducing the Nash gap over the strongest baseline by 35.6% and 24.7%, respectively, with minimal hyperparameter tuning.

Abstract: ARC-AGI-3 evaluates agents in interactive environments whose rules and objectives must be inferred from observation. We present Kepler, an open-source harness that represents hypotheses as executable world models and validates them through retrospective transition checks and conditional prediction checks. Under one frozen Claude Opus 5 configuration, Kepler obtained a server-verified 100.00 RHAE on all 25 public games, with no per-game model selection or score-conditioned reruns. On 181 of 183 completed levels, the final Opus attempt used no more actions than the corresponding median-human baseline. The retained board runs used 8,256 environment actions, of which 7,292 occurred in scored levels. Retained local provider-session records yield 858.0 million tokens, 97.37% cache reads, and a \$777.72 cost at September 1, 2026 API list-equivalent rates. We also report three evaluation failures: source-code leakage that produced an invalid perfect run, agents reconstructing a removed harness in a control condition, and autonomous repair masking a broken planner. A single-game observation case study showed that animation frames contained task-relevant information absent from settled text grids. Across the final Claude Opus 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol boards, 48 of 50 game-model cells reached 100. These results indicate that public-set score alone has limited discriminative value and motivate first-attempt, cost-conditioned, and verification-aware reporting.

Abstract: Anchor and Perturb (AnP) is a lightweight framework that resolves multi-agent coordination failures by decoupling exploratory variance injection from recurrent manifold stability. Existing remediation strategies predominantly alter mixing network architectures or enforce simultaneous exploration across the collective, which inevitably precipitates severe temporal-difference penalties in non-monotonic reward spaces. Specifically, AnP isolates underperforming lazy agents and injects an asymmetric exploratory pulse into targeted coordinates whilst anchoring converged teammates to nominal greedy exploitation. Empirical telemetry benchmarks demonstrate that AnP successfully rescues collapsed joint policies (recovering from a 5% evaluation win rate nadir back to 85%) and facilitates escape from suboptimal coordination plateaus, sustaining peak win rates of 90% without requiring structural network modifications.

Abstract: Learning in robotic games is constrained not only by strategic information but also by what the body can still execute. We study this coupling in a hierarchical humanoid-quadruped penalty system in which game-level self-play policies command fixed soccer whole-body controllers (S-WBCs). The humanoid shooting skill is initialized from self-collected motion-capture data, whereas the quadruped saving skill is learned by reinforcement learning. We introduce dynamics-induced commitment mapping (DIC-Map), a body-grounded analysis that estimates continuation capability, identifies the first persistent loss of a terminal alternative, and tests whether the remaining interaction admits a reduced zero-sum game. For symmetric terminal alternatives, the reduced game yields a closed-form bound on optimal strategy concentration determined by the responder's value of deferring. We further show that, when the responder acts through an estimator, equal response values eliminate the direct terminal-allocation gradient and leave an estimator-mediated first-order learning channel. Experiments locate commitment about 0.29 s before contact, and changing only ball speed shifts deferral coverage. Across four responder policies, replacing the estimator raises save rate from 0.240 to 0.472, whereas a comparable gain in read accuracy obtained by waiting raises it only to 0.246. Posterior analysis is used for the equilibrium comparison because the available coverage terms are observational proxies. Project website: https://chris-ruizegeng.github.io/penaltykick/