Papers for
ai developer teams
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Human review reveals hidden failures in web agent evaluations
Auditing Web Agent Evaluation on WebArena-Lite: Human Review of Outcomes and Trajectories
Abstract: Web agents are an important application of large language models, yet their evaluation often depends on rule based or language model evaluators that inspect only the final outcome. Human verification of task completion and detailed analysis of failed trajectories remain limited. We audit all 165 WebArena Lite tasks under six evaluation conditions built from GPT 5.5 and an untrained Qwen3.5 9B model. The audit retains the original score, corrects false negatives from the automatic evaluator, identifies the first consequential error, and examines progress across the trajectory. We also study a Memory and Analysis Support Mechanism (MASM), which maintains explicit execution state, and Guide Text, which provides task relevant procedural guidance. Across four GPT 5.5 settings, human review recovers 5.45 to 8.49 percentage points of success missed by the evaluator. With a 25 step budget, Guide Text raises corrected success with MASM from 34.55% to 38.18%. On the untrained Qwen3.5 9B model, MASM raises the evaluator score from 13.90% to 18.80%. Review of 102 failed GPT 5.5 trajectories reveals frequent scrolling loops, unfinished exploration, premature answers, invalid actions, and incomplete form workflows. Step level evidence further shows that substantial early progress can coexist with a final failure. These results show why final scores alone provide an incomplete account of web agent behavior and motivate human grounded, trajectory aware verification.
Agent harness records need second author for trustworthy audit
Hearsay: Can an Auditor Trust the Record a Deployed Agent Harness Writes?
Abstract: An agent harness, the code that turns a model into an agent, writes its own record of each run, and that record is all a later reader gets when a run is disputed, investigated or audited. We call a record evidentiary when a reader who was not there can check it without trusting the writer. Across sixteen deployed frameworks, none writes one in full. Hearsay examines the record, not the task: five harnesses run fourteen tasks, three blinded LLM examiners and a human panel read the records, and every excerpt an examiner quotes is checked mechanically for who wrote it. First, the record lets a reader name the fault but not prove how the run went. Examiners name the right fault in 74 to 91% of 140 runs, but the fault can be proved only from two files the benchmark adds; for what happened in between, fewer than one citation in ten lands on anything the harness did not write, and the examiner with the fewest false alarms catches half of the entries we delete, rewrite or fabricate. Second, the remedy is a second author, not a stronger seal on the first. An append-only log of what passes between harness and model, kept outside the harness and read against the record in both directions, reports all 28 omissions and fabrications we made a harness commit as it ran, where a hash chain over the harness's own record passes all 28. Handed the log, examiners keep their fault verdicts but rest more of their citations on what the harness did not write. What makes a record evidence is who writes it, not what is captured.