ai deployment engineers

Abstract: We present \tool, a query-efficient framework for black-box probabilistic verification. Given a fixed, sampleable input distribution and a binary property oracle, \tool assesses the property's violation probability $p$ against a threshold $θ$. Under independent sampling and stateless oracle behavior, acceptance asserts $p\leθ$, rejection asserts $p>θ+η$ for a user-specified separation margin, and an inconclusive verdict indicates insufficient evidence for either conclusion. The probability of each type of erroneous verdict is bounded by its specified error budget. To support this three-valued contract efficiently, \tool uses a single sequential test, eliminating the interval family required by the baseline. The test accounts for repeated sampling checks through either corrected exact binomial confidence intervals or an anytime-valid confidence sequence. We apply \tool to probabilistic local model semantic consistency, where the property oracle detects decision-level inconsistencies between reference and compiled executions under a specified perturbation distribution. Our evaluation covers 24 tasks across TorchInductor and TensorRT and examines sampling efficiency, conclusiveness, and diagnostic behavior. For sampling efficiency, we use paired one-model clean-label radius searches: the baseline requires 3.6-4.2 times as many unique samples under matched numerical parameters while providing a weaker decision contract. For model semantic consistency, checks at $θ=10^{-3}$ yield 817 acceptances, 19 inconclusive verdicts, and 4 rejections across 840 input--backend instances from 21 tasks. Case studies of two documented compiler faults further demonstrate what these local verdicts can diagnose.

Abstract: While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning, alignment through reinforcement learning often induces systemic overconfidence. In production environments, where logits may be unavailable, robust black-box uncertainty quantification (UQ) is essential for trustworthiness and safety. Focusing on question-answering for LRMs, we show that existing black-box methods, such as paraphrase-based self-consistency and confidence verbalization, offer little to no improvement over simple repeated sampling, suggesting that alignment suppresses useful output variability. We introduce prompt-level relaxation operators that broaden the model's effective output distribution by approximating the effect of an optimal policy obtained with a stronger KL-regularization parameter, hence closer to the reference model. Theoretically, we demonstrate that relaxation improves calibration. We propose Jailbreak for Uncertainty (J4U), a jailbreak-derived technique for UQ that empirically reproduces the behavioral signatures predicted by our relaxation theory. Across 3 datasets and 4 LRMs, including a closed-source production model, J4U's improvement over repeated sampling achieves statistical significance in up to 6 times more LRM-dataset-metric settings than the strongest black-box UQ state-of-the-art baseline we evaluate, with average ECE reductions up to 5 times larger. These results provide a practical tool for UQ in black-box LRM deployment.

Abstract: Scaling a language model is not only a question of final quality: the architectural choice determines how much computation is spent during training, prompt processing, and autoregressive decoding to achieve certain model quality. An ideal model architecture should lower all above computation costs to facilitate scaling to a larger model, while ensure the larger model indeed outperforms smaller baselines. We introduce KV-Invariant Transformer Expansion (KITE), a scaling paradigm that achieves this goal. It trains the model from a smaller size to a larger size (i.e., saving training costs via upcycling), while places newly added parameters in regions that do not affect attention KV. Consequently, during inference, prefilling KV only relies on the smaller part of the model, so the inference costs are saved. As a concrete instantiation, we present Step Scale Transformer (SST), a two-tower decoder in which one tower produces KV and the other reads them. At comparable cumulative training compute, SST, a 67B MoE model with 2.15B active body parameters per decode token, achieves lower training loss than 47B and 63B MoE Transformers with 1.48B and 2.02B active body parameters, respectively, while reducing estimated inference cost by 6.7% and 31.6%.

Abstract: Quantization is one of the default deployment paths for open-weight LLM agents, but it is not behavior-preserving: an adversary can release a full-precision checkpoint that passes audits yet misbehaves once quantized, termed as quantization-conditioned attack (QCA). Prior QCA work targets free-text generation, where harm is mediated by a human reader. In contrast, the agentic setting poses a more severe risk: the triggered payload is a structured function that can be executed without human oversight. We present the first study of QCA against LLM agents. We find that directly adapting prior backdoor-injection methods can produce malicious behavior after quantization, but substantially degrades benign utility, rendering the resulting attacks impractical. To understand the true upper bound of the threat, we propose AGENTQ, an attack framework that combines layer-banded LoRA injection with partial-PGD repair over a multi-codebook quantization-equivalence class. AGENTQ preserves normal agentic capability while concentrating malicious behavior in the quantized model. Across three trigger-action pairs and three codebooks (NF4, FP4, INT8), AGENTQ reaches up to 100% post-quantization attack success rate with minimal loss of benign utility, underscoring the need to make quantization-aware safety evaluation a standard requirement before open-weight agents are deployed.

Abstract: Enterprises deploy systems, not checkpoints. Usable capability depends jointly on weights, serving route, precision, output contract, and harness, yet all 18 audited benchmarks score advertised model identifiers. We treat this as measurement error and give a protocol that makes it reportable. It has three parts. A gold-blind capability-binding preflight verifies that a route can execute the evaluation contract before any task reaches it; a reliability-inclusive first-pass scoring rule keeps failure in the score while keeping unsupported capability out; and adjudication is structurally score-blind. We call the protocol IB2 and release its algorithms, classification tables, request contract, and manifest schemas. Its reference instantiation, 128 locked tasks and 987 assertions over document, spreadsheet, chart, tool and database work, stays sealed: the procedure is the artifact, not the corpus. Across eleven systems, four results. Capability availability is measurable: two complete single-route runs on identical weights later failed distinct predicates of the finalized binding gate, while a third passed that gate before a fresh run. The advertised identifier exposed neither limit. Discrimination is not uniform: four of seven suites saturate under a six-system band, with the spread almost entirely from governed database work and multi-tab joins, so we report interval-backed resolution groups, not ranks; two of the nominal five-label output's four cuts fail multiplicity adjustment. Serving-arm choice moved one declared revision and precision from 77.38 to 82.54, paired interval [0.11,10.60], though the arms differ in access mode, harness generation, and the serving tool-call parser, and harness generation is a property of our evaluator, not any endpoint. Excluding failed responses from denominators changes the point ordering, so reliability inclusion changes a conclusion, not its wording.

Abstract: Existing evaluation frameworks mostly assess only one part of AI agents, such as task completion (AgentBench) or security robustness (AgentDojo, ASB), rather than the complete pipeline of planning, tool selection, tool execution, memory and reasoning. Failures can occur at any stage, yet existing benchmarks rarely identify their precise source. AgentAudit evaluates the entire execution trace across ten capability, grounding, security and behavioural dimensions, namely instruction integrity, planner, memory, tool selection, tool invocation, tool correctness, alignment, tool faithfulness, security and execution integrity, combined with behavioural classification and failure attribution to pinpoint the exact stage responsible for an observed failure. AgentAudit can evaluate any LLM-based AI agent, since it attaches to the agent instead of replacing it. It reads only the recorded execution trace and does not interfere with how the agent runs, so it places no constraint on the agent's internal implementation. We evaluate five language models (OpenAI GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 5, Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash) across nine capability and adversarial tasks. Claude Sonnet 5 and GPT-5 obtain the highest mean Composite Trust Scores (95.1 and 80.6 out of 100, respectively), while Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash trail substantially (57.6, 45.7 and 22.6). All traces were scored by a single fixed judge model, which was itself one of the evaluated models, a limitation discussed in Section VII.E. More importantly, models with similar task-completion behaviour can diverge sharply in trustworthiness, as several non-frontier models are repeatedly classified Unsafe_Compliance on adversarial tasks rather than merely failing them, a distinction that pass/fail benchmarks cannot surface.