Papers for

ai behavior analysts

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Cooperation in AI agent networks changes with language and peers

The Butterfly Defects: Tracing Cooperation in LLM Agent Networks

Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) increasingly operate as interconnected agents, a fundamental question emerges: does individual cooperation translate into collective cooperation? We investigate this question through the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), moving from dyadic interactions to homogeneous and heterogeneous networks of open-weight LLMs. Our findings reveal that cooperation is highly sensitive to model composition and seemingly minor linguistic changes. Models that cooperate with identical peers can shift toward defection in mixed populations. A simple uncertainty cue can increase or decrease cooperation, redistribute costs, and affect unexposed agents several hops away. Even reversing action-label order can dramatically alter behavior, with uncertainty framing sometimes amplifying this sensitivity. Together, these findings challenge the notion of cooperation as a stable model-level property, revealing how strategic behavior depends on interaction partners, network positions, and the language used to frame decisions.

Fri 23 OctComputation and Language
The gist
When large language models act as agents working together, their willingness to cooperate is not fixed. The authors studied a game that tests cooperation and found that small changes—like the other models they interact with or how choices are described—can make models switch from cooperating to competing. Even subtle cues about uncertainty or reversing labels of choices affected behavior dramatically. This shows that cooperation depends on the network and language, not just on the models themselves.
Open → 2610.32726v1

Large language models show mismatched self-reports and behaviors in risk taking

Representational Control over Self-Report & Behavior Coherence in LLM Risk-Taking

Abstract: Self-report is an appealing low-cost probe of an LLM's dispositions, but recent work finds only selective agreement between what models report and how they behave. Prior accounts establish these patterns by prompting black-box LLMs, leaving open whether the gap is a prompting artefact or a fact about how the underlying constructs are represented internally. We investigate risk-taking, a consequential dimension of agentic decision-making, using activation steering to measure self-report and behavior under the same internal intervention. We survey nine steering-vector extraction methods spanning task-specific directives, the model's own task behavior, and dispositional descriptions at two granularities, evaluated on two behavioral tasks and two psychometric instruments across four open-weight LLMs. We find that (1) a shared internal intervention does not ensure shared responsiveness: directions built from trait descriptions move self-report but leave behavior at chance, directions built from the model's own task choices do the reverse, and only task-specific directives reach both, weakly. (2) Diagnosis dissolves that exception: removing surface confounders leaves the directives only 32% of their behavioral effect. The two channels are otherwise steered by near-orthogonal directions, each channel reachable by several independent constructions. (3) An intervention composing one behavior-moving and one self-report-moving direction moves both together; flipping one sign sets them in opposition, with reported and enacted risk pointing in opposite directions on 69-89% of flipped compositions in all models. These findings move the self-report-behavior relationship from a black-box observation to a representational one that can be inspected and controlled, motivating representational checks alongside behavioral evaluation.

Fri 2 OctComputation and LanguageArtificial IntelligenceComputers and Society
The gist
Large language models sometimes say they would take risks but behave differently when tested, or vice versa. The authors studied this mismatch by looking inside the model’s decision process rather than just what it says. They found that the parts of the model controlling self-report and those controlling behavior can be steered separately, and even pushed in opposite directions. This suggests that what models say about themselves isn’t always aligned with what they actually do.
Open → 2610.04125v1