ad tech engineers

Abstract: Conversational assistants are becoming the place where people ask what to buy, and sponsored content is moving into their answers. Several advertisers then compete for one sponsored slot, and all of them read the same conversation, so their willingness to pay usually moves together. Existing auctions for LLM advertising treat these values as independent. We therefore present AffMyerson, an auction that captures this correlation and turns it into revenue. We model the advertisers' values given the conversation as a multivariate normal and turn the economic premise of positive dependence (affiliation) into a sign condition on the precision matrix. We design a neural parameterization whose every output satisfies it. We prove that every prior in this family yields a truthful, ex-post individually rational auction, so estimation error can cost revenue but never truthfulness. We derive the conditional virtual values in closed form. By the design of the prior, pricing an auction needs no matrix inversion and takes O(n^2) time, fast enough to run at query time. We also work out the log-normal family used in empirical ad-auction work. There we prove that the auction is truthful for every prior and revenue-optimal when the prior is correct, and that the virtual value is regular everywhere whenever the conditional spread is below a loose threshold, which our fitted priors stay well under. With LLM-agent bidders, AffMyerson earns 6.2% more than a second-price auction with a tuned reserve, 6.1% more than Ronen's lookahead auction with the same prior, and 9.2% more than Myerson's auction run as if values were independent. This gain is still 4.5% on real keyword search queries where willingness to pay is hard to read. The correlation comes from common demand. Agents that judge the conversation bid together and agents told to calculate do not. The gain from conditioning moves with the correlation.

Abstract: Standard causal identification methods often assume no unmeasured confounding and can fail when relevant confounders are unobserved. Proximal causal inference instead uses proxy variables to identify effects under hidden confounding. However, nonparametric proximal estimation can be challenging in practice: recovering causal estimands such as the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) requires solving an ill-posed integral equation that is data-hungry, hyperparameter-sensitive, and optimization-unstable. Bayesian inference for such models provides a desirable alternative, mitigating these difficulties by regularizing through the prior. However, computing a posterior is itself challenging, as a typical likelihood function will include latent variables. Following the recent success of tabular foundation models in backdoor, instrumental variable, and frontdoor settings, we propose that prior-data fitted networks (PFNs) are uniquely suited to resolve this bottleneck. Indeed, by training on synthetic data sampled from compliant structural causal models with access to oracle counterfactuals, we simplify the task substantially, amortizing the implied Bayesian operator inversion into a single transformer forward pass. Compared to prior literature that focuses primarily on point estimation, our model, ProximalFM, explicitly targets the Bayesian posterior distribution of the CATE. One unique aspect of this problem is that we need to provide Monte Carlo estimates of the oracle CATEs, leading to a novel variation of PFNs that accounts for the added stochastic error. Across a diverse suite of proximal regimes, ProximalFM achieves consistently strong CATE-estimation performance without dataset-specific tuning, with its largest advantage when latent confounding is substantial and the proxies are weakly informative; it also provides fast inference through a single amortized forward pass.

Abstract: We study fair multi-armed bandits under the Nash Social Welfare (NSW) objective, which measures performance via the geometric mean of accumulated rewards. Existing work defines Nash regret as $\mathrm{NR}_T = μ^\star - (\prod_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}μ_{I_t})^{1/T}$, where $μ_{I_t}$ is the mean reward of the recommended arm $I_t$ and $T$ is the horizon. Since it applies the geometric mean to per-round marginal expectations, it ignores the joint distribution of rewards across rounds, leaving the NSW fairness motivation unaddressed at the trajectory level. We propose \emph{trajectory-wise Nash regret} $\widetilde{\mathrm{NR}}_T = μ^\star - \mathbb{E}[(\prod_{t=1}^T μ_{I_t})^{1/T}]$, which computes the geometric mean over complete sample paths before taking expectations, capturing NSW fairness more faithfully. By Jensen's inequality, $\widetilde{\mathrm{NR}}_T \geq \mathrm{NR}_T$, making it a strictly stronger metric. We also introduce \emph{high probability Nash regret} $\widehat{\mathrm{NR}}_T = μ^\star - (\prod_t μ_{I_t})^{1/T}$, giving the first high probability regret bounds in fair bandits. Our two-phase algorithm, Round Robin Nash Confidence Bound (\texttt{RR-NCB}), combines round robin exploration with a Nash confidence bound index policy. We show $\widetilde{\mathrm{NR}}_T \leq \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{k\log T/T})$ and, with probability $1-δ$, $\widehat{\mathrm{NR}}_T \leq \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{k\log(kT/δ)/T})$, matching the optimal $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{k/T})$ rate despite the stronger metrics. Optimality follows from a lower bound via AM-GM and standard $k$-armed bandit minimax arguments. Simulations validate our theory.

Abstract: Auto-bidding is a key component of modern advertising systems that provides a personalized bidding strategy for each advertiser. By characterizing each individual, profile-based methods achieve personalization and have proven effective in domains such as recommendation. However, despite the diverse bidding behavior of advertisers, their application to auto-bidding remains limited. A primary reason is that constructing and leveraging advertiser profiles face several challenges: extracting pure profiles is non-trivial, modeling common and private information simultaneously is difficult, and profile updating and cold-start adaptation remain challenging. To tackle these issues, we propose \textbf{ADAPT}, an \underline{\textbf{A}}uto-bidding framework with \underline{\textbf{D}}isentangled \underline{\textbf{A}}dvertiser \underline{\textbf{P}}rofiles and \underline{\textbf{T}}raining-free adaptation. ADAPT introduces a two-stage training paradigm and supports training-free adaptation. Specifically, (i) the stage 1 extracts pure static and dynamic profiles via contrastive learning over the advertiser memory bank; (ii) the stage 2 disentangles the dynamic profile into a common profile and a private profile, and combines them with the static profile to jointly condition the bidding strategy; (iii) once trained, ADAPT constructs profiles for new advertisers and updates profiles of existing advertisers without retraining. Our experiments on a large-scale auto-bidding benchmark demonstrate that ADAPT consistently achieves superior performance, and ablation studies further validate the effectiveness of each module. The source code will be released at https://github.com/YuzunoKawori/ADAPT.