Papers for

access control system developers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

TrustJev improves policy decision safety against instruction attacks

TrustJev: Separating Policy Authority from Untrusted Evidence in LLM-Based Decisions

Abstract: Decision models enable software to select from predefined actions using natural language inputs. However, the external evidence that supplies facts for these decisions may also contain instructions that attempt to override the application's policy. We propose TrustJev, a framework combining protected policy scoring with bounded evidence corrections. A single Transformer backbone computes policy scores and a correction budget from trusted policy and candidates, then bounds evidence corrections by that budget. Paired supervision encourages stable predictions under instruction insertions that preserve task facts and changed preferences when edits change the correct answer. Authority supervision accommodates evidence when the policy alone cannot determine the decision. We evaluate a 0.6B implementation against 14 baselines on three datasets covering authentication, instruction hierarchy, and executable authorization rules. TrustJev achieves the highest mean Balance, the harmonic mean of accuracy on non-attack and attack inputs, exceeding the strongest baseline on each by 0.57-1.05 percentage points. In the authorization benchmark, it correctly answers all 32 attacks per source in a fixed pool for 95.77% of sources, compared with 80.98% for the strongest comparator. TrustJev maintains comparable inference memory and median latency, with additional overhead primarily during training.

Mon 26 OctArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Sometimes software needs to decide what to do based on facts given in natural language. But the facts it receives might also try to trick it into ignoring its rules. The authors built TrustJev, a system that carefully separates trusted rules from potentially tricky evidence to keep decisions correct. Their tests show TrustJev better resists attacks that try to override rules without losing accuracy on normal inputs.
Open → 2610.34826v1

Learned access control audits reveal high rates of silent permission errors

Auditing the Hand-Written Inputs of Learned Access Control

Abstract: Learned access control is typically deployed behind two hand-built artefacts: a hard-deny set enforced by a small trusted shield, and a region map that decides which requests mined rules answer and which the learner answers. Verifying the shield or measuring the learner validates neither. We audit both on the five public ABAC Lab policies. First, we formalise hard-deny soundness and check it exhaustively over relations of up to 794,250 tuples. Clauses that faithfully transcribe an explicit restriction are unsound at rates of 0.50-0.70 across four elicitors - an author and three blind language-model elicitors - because prose scopes restrictions to a section while the grant relation is a disjunction over all rules: 97% of counterexamples are granted by other rules. Shipped unchecked, these deny sets would withhold 16-78% of everything the policies grant; certified, they withhold nothing. Vacuity, a second silent failure, also occurs. Second, hybrid routing needs a two-class, abstaining rule set that ABAC miners do not emit, and ranking a mixed-effect candidate pool under a cap is one-class in all 24 cells for the two commonest ranking keys. Third, for additive losses the hybrid-versus-learner effect factorises into covered mass times a rule-learner risk contrast that must be reported on both false-non-grant and false-permit loss: on two real policies, most selection rules give opposite verdicts on the two losses, and the one favourable on both holds for one policy, one learner configuration and a band of noise levels. A released artefact regenerates and checks every reported number.

Thu 22 OctCryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Access control systems decide who can do what in software, often using rules learned from data plus some fixed restrictions. The authors found that the fixed rules meant to block unwanted access often fail silently, allowing unintended permissions because they misunderstand how restrictions apply. They also showed common learning methods don't produce the proper rules needed for combining fixed and learned controls. Finally, their analysis revealed different ways to measure errors can give opposite results, complicating assessment. They provide tools to check and reproduce these findings.
Open → 2610.31388v1

Policy rules determine allowed reasoning steps beyond relevance

Governed Deduction: Policy-Grounded Premise Authorization Beyond Relevance

Abstract: Reasoning systems usually treat premise use as a question of relevance: if a fact is available and useful, it may be selected for inference. Authorization imposes a different constraint: a premise may be represented and logically usable but not permitted for a particular local transition. We formalize this distinction as Governed Deduction (GD), with a transition-local admission predicate admit(p, tau, S). From an independently produced RBAC-augmented Spider benchmark, we construct 4,461 matched authorization pairs in which the same query premise and policy state support permitted and denied consuming transitions. An initial joint controller reaches 99.19% held-out accuracy, but a transition-only control reaches 100%, exposing a role-name shortcut. After a frozen, label-independent context-local role permutation removes that shortcut, premise/state-only, transition-only, and joint linear controllers all score exactly 50% on 1,856 held-out edges, while a symbolic policy oracle remains at 100%. The result is a controlled negative finding: the benchmark instantiates policy-grounded authorization beyond relevance, but the frozen linear representation does not recover the relation. Matched one-sided controls and leakage audits are therefore essential for evaluating learned policy-sensitive reasoning.

Fri 25 SeptArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Normally, logic systems pick facts that seem relevant to use in making conclusions. This paper points out that even if a fact is relevant and usable, it might not be allowed by local rules or policies in specific steps. The authors create a benchmark to test this idea and find that simple learning methods can accidentally cheat by finding shortcuts, while others struggle to correctly model these permission rules. This shows it’s hard for computers to learn when certain facts are actually authorized for use, beyond just being relevant.
Open → 2609.31029v1