Papers for

access control engineers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Language models explanations often fail to guide denied request fixes

Right Reason, Wrong Advice: Evaluating Recourse in LLM Explanations of Denied Requests

Abstract: Language models increasingly write the explanations people receive when a rule system denies their request. If several rules deny the request independently, an explanation can name a true reason and still leave the person denied after they fix it. We call the missing property recourse validity: changing what the explanation cites, without changing what was asked for, can flip the decision. We compute it exactly, and a hitting-set argument predicts from the policy alone when a correct reason fails. In six of seven rule systems ported from access control and US benefit eligibility, a single correct reason almost never gives recourse when several reasons apply. Across 20 LLMs, checks of whether the cited reasons are correct, computed or asked of an LLM judge, are close to chance at spotting this failure, as the argument predicts. A strong judge asked whether acting on the explanation would work does spot it. Stronger and reasoning models do better but still fail on many denials with four or more independent reasons. Asking for every rule helps every open model with room to improve. Explanations of eligibility decisions should be built from the decision function and judged by whether acting on them works.

Mon 16 NovArtificial IntelligenceComputation and LanguageComputers and Society
The gist
When a computer denies a request based on many rules, it can explain the reason, but fixing that reason might not help get approval. The authors show that explanations often lack "recourse validity," meaning a person can't change the outcome by addressing the cited reason alone. They tested many models and found that most fail to detect when explanations don’t provide a helpful path to success. Better explanations come from linking explanations closely to the decision rules and checking if acting on them would actually help.
Open → 2611.21545v1

Causal provenance ensures safe authority use and prevents confused deputies

Full Provenance on the COSS Causal Axis: An Event-Level Closure of Causal Attribution and Confused-Deputy Exclusion

Abstract: Provenance Identity Continuity (PIC) represents an authority-use event as an operation/resource behavior situated in a causal lineage, $(o,r,\ell)\in O\times R\times L$. We make the causal occurrence itself primitive: a represented security-relevant causal graph $(E,\to_c)$ in which each occurrence has a unique causal history, so the consistent event-lineage space is canonically isomorphic to $E$. The modeled execution has one causal partial order; distinct lineages are distinct causal histories inside it and may share a root while diverging into incomparable branches. PIC's $O\times R\times L$ is the authority-behavior projection of this space, and Causally Ordered Security-State (COSS) continuity generalizes it to an arbitrary behavior product over the same causal execution. On this semantics we prove an architecture-independent confused-deputy exclusion theorem. PIC continuation requires $C(e')\subseteq C(e)$ on every ordinary causal edge, so descendants are bounded by their ancestors; at an ordinary join, authority available on only one incoming branch cannot be resurrected, even when branches share a common root. Non-conservative combination must be an explicit authorized composition or relaxation event. With protected-effect mediation, an effect caused by request $q$ through an ordinary authority segment can exercise only authority in $C(q)$, so a confused-deputy state is contradictory. The result holds for any system whose protected request-to-effect causes are faithfully represented and whose ordinary authority transport satisfies PIC. We revisit Rajani, Garg, and Rezk: their value, control-flow, and initial-heap attacks are different witnesses of causal ancestry, so full provenance is an evidence mechanism for recovering edges of the causal graph, not the foundation of the PIC theorem. Finally we lift it to the COSS product of heterogeneous security-state coordinates.

Wed 4 NovCryptography and SecurityDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
The gist
This paper tackles how to track the origins and use of authority in computer systems to avoid security mistakes like confused deputies—where permissions are accidentally misused. The authors make each security-relevant event a basic building block in a causal graph, ensuring every event has a unique history. By doing this, they prove that authority can only flow in predictable, safe ways, preventing malicious or accidental privilege misuse. Their results apply broadly to systems that correctly record requests and authority usage.
Open → 2611.07164v1